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I. INTRODUCTION ; 
It is commonly understood that the tax law is composed of a complicated and 
interrelated set of statutory provisions. This raises the possibility that changes to 
one area of the law may necessitate revisions to other areas. While statutory 
change sometimes means that other provisions need to. be added or amended, 
there is also the possibility that the enactment of a new provision allows for the 
repeal of another rule because it is either deadwood or simply no longer sensible 
in light of the rule's intended purpose as well as fundamental tax policies. 
A simplification study released by the Joint Committee on Taxation in 2001 
indicates the prevalence of this deadwood (and the like) phenomenon. This 
study recommends the repeal of 105 pro\'isions identified as pure deadwood. 1 
The study also proposes the elimination of other provisions that no longer serve 
sound policy objectives as a result of tax law changes since their.enactment.2 
Given the tax law's interrelated ~tatutory scheme and frequent changes, the 
extent of the deadwood phenomenon should come as no surprise . 
. An area that is ripe for such a deadwood analysis is the Foreign Investment in 
Real Property Tax Act ("FIRPTA"),3 and in particular section 897.4 Indeed, 
FIRPT A has been ripe for such an analysis since the changesyffected by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.5 This Article suggests that the repeal of portions of FIRPT A 
'See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE.OFTHE 
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PuRSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(8) OF 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, VOLUME II: RECOMMENDATIONS OF mE STAFF OF .THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION TO SIMPLIFY THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 579,579-593 (Comm. Print 2001). 
2See id. at 436-439 (recommending the repeal of the .secondary withholding tax on dividends from 
certain foreign corporations that is contained in section 861(a)(2)(B), given that it has largely been 
replaced by the branch profits tax); id. at 440-443 (recommending the repeal section 871(a)(2), 
which imposes a tax on capital gains of certain nonresident aliens, given that this provision applies 
in very limited cases as a result of changes in the tax law since its enactment). 
3Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980). 
4All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended (the "Code"). 
sOther commentators have questioned the continuing need for aspects of FIRPT A in light of 
subsequent statutory changes and have briefly examined the issue, the most extensive of which is an 
excellent, concise analysis by Professor Cynthia Blum of whether the repeal of the General Utilities 
doctrine calls for the elimination of the section 897 tax that applies to dispositions of stock in certain 
U.S. realty holding corporations. See Cynthia Blum, How the United States Should Tax Foreign 
Shareholders, 7 VA. TAX REv. 583, 668-675 (1988); see also Harvey P. Dale, Effectively Connected 
Income, 42 TAX L. REv. 689, 714-715 (1987) (very brief analysis); Alan L. Feld, Is FIRPTA 
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may be in order and sets forth an analysis of the various considerations in 
arriving at this conclusion. 
A. FIRPTA 's Legislative Background 
FIRPT A was enacted in 1980 in order to remove the perceived competitive 
advantage experienced by foreign 'persons under the tax law in purchasing U.S. 
real estate. Prior to FIRPT A,. foreign persons had used several techniques to 
avoid federal income tax upon the disposition of U.S. real estate, while obtain-
ing net basis taxation during the operation of the real property.6 For example, a 
foreign person could operate U.S. realty as a trade or business and then dispose 
of the realty iIi' an installment sale so that gain was recognized after the foreign 
person was no longer engaged in a U.S. business.7 This technique allowed the 
taxpayer to achieve net basis taxation during the operations phase,S which often 
meant no federal tax liability during this phase because deductions for deprecia-
tion, taxes and interest could offset gross income from operations.9 If the foreign 
person did not maintain aU.S. business when the gain from the disposition was 
recognized on the installment method, the realty gain would not be taxable 
under the effectively connected regime,1O nor would it be taxable under the fixed 
or determinable, annual or periodic ("FDAP") regime as that regime exempts 
most types of gain. II In a variation on this technique, the foreign person disposed 
of the U.S. real estate by exchanging it for foreign real property in a qualifying 
nonrecognition' transaction under the like-kind rule,t2 and subsequently disposed 
a"f the foreign realty in a sale that w~uld be beyond U.S. tax jurisdiction. 13 The 
like-kind exchange strategy would permit an ultimate disposition of the foreign 
realty that was free of U.S. tax even if the taxpayer were actually engaged in a 
U.S. business for the year of the salel4 (or had made a Code election to be so 
treated)Y Another technique employed to obtain little or no U.S. taxation on the 
. (Partially) Obsolete?, 35 TAX NOTES 607, 607-608 (very brief analysis) (1987); Fred Feingold and 
Peter A. Glicklich, An Analysis of the Temporary Regulations Under F1RPTA: Part I, 69 J. TAX'N 
262,262-64 (1988) (brief analysis); Letter from New York Bar Ass'n Tax Section to House Ways and 
Means Comm., 9 TAX MGMT. WEEKLY REp. 670 (1990) (one paragraph statement); Statement of Nat 'I 
Foreign Trade Council to House Ways'and Means Comm., 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 39-70 (1991) (one 
paragraph statement). . 
·See H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 509-511(1980); S. REP. No. 96-532, at 11-12 (1979). 
7SeeH.R. REP. No: 96-1167, supra note 6 at 509-510; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II. 
'See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882. 
'See H. REP. No. 96-1167; supra note 6 at 509; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II. 
!OSee I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882; H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra 
note 6 at II. 
IISee I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881; Reg. § 1.144I-I(b); H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 509; S. REp. 
No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 10. 
12See 1.R.c. § 1031. 
l3See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II. 
14See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II. 
ISSections 871(d) and 882(d) provide nonresident aliens and . foreign corporations, respectively~ 
with an election to treat income from U.S. real property as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or 
business. Once made, an election is in effect for all subsequent years unless revoked with the consent 
of the Service.I.R.C. §§ 871(d), 882(d). 
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operation and disposition of U.S. real property was to take advantage of certain 
treaties that allowed taxpayers to make an annual election to treat U.S. real 
estate activities as a U.S. trade or business. 16 
Foreign persons were also able to achieve this desired tax avoidance treatment 
by using corporations to conduct their U.S. real estate activities. Under this 
technique, a foreign person would conduct U.S. realty activities as a business 
through either a U.S. or foreign corporation, and thus obtain U.S. net basis 
taxation on these operations. I? The foreign person could then dispose of the U.S. 
real property by first having the corporation sell the U.S. real property after 
adopting a plan of liquidation, and then having the corporation distribute the 
proceeds of the sale to the shareholder in exchange for her stock. IS Under the 
former General Utilities doctrine, the liquidating corporation would not have 
recognized any gain on the sale,19 and any gain to the foreign shareholder on the 
liquidation would generally be free of U.S. tax under the effectively connected 
and FDAP regimes.20 Alternatively, the foreign investor could have sold stock in 
the corporation to the purchaser, with any gain on the sale generally not being 
subject to U.S. taxY The purchaser of the stock, even if a U.S. person, could 
then liquidate the corporation free of U.S. tax, because the former General 
Utilities doctrine would result in nonrecognition treatment at the corporate level,22 
and there would be no realized gain at the shareholder level given that the 
shareholder's basis should equal the appreciated value of the real property.23 
In contrast to the ability of foreign persons to avoid U.S. taxation on the 
disposition of U.S. real estate, U.S. persons enjoyed no such treatment. Conse-
quently, the existing rules as applied to the taxation of U.S. realty arguably 
violated notions of horizontal equity by subjecting U.S. taxpayers to more oner-
ous U.S. tax treatment on U.S. real estate activities than foreign taxpayers?' This 
in turn arguably resulted in foreign persons having a competitive advantage over 
their U.S. counterparts in acquiring U.S. real estate.25 
I"See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12. 
"See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II. 
"See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12. 
19See I.R.C. § 337 (prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986); H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 
510; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12. 
'OSee I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 871(b), 881, 882; H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REP. No. 
96-532, supra note 6 at 12. In rare circumstances, the shareholder's gain may have been subject to 
tax under section 871 (a)(2). 
"See 1.R.c. §§ 871(a), 871(b), 881, 882; H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6, at 510; S. REp. No. 
96-532, supra note 6, at 12. 
"See I.R.C. § 336 (prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986). 
23See H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510-511; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12. 
24See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF S. 1915 RELATING TO THE 
TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL PROPERTY (Joint Comm. Print 1984); H. REP. 
No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12-13. 
"See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 24 (quoting a 1979 General Accounting 
Office study as follows: "elimination of the tax advantage foreign investors have would remove a 
factor that may be preventing potential U.S. purchasers from competing effectively with potential 
foreign purchasers"); cf H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511 (stating the U.S. tax law should 
not continue to provide an inducement for foreign investment in U.S real property); S. REP. No. 96-
532, supra note 6 at 13. 
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FIRPTA was enacted to ensure that dispositions of U.S. real property by 
foreign persons would not escape federal· income tax, which resulted in the 
removal of the U.S. tax advantage experienced by foreign taxpayers.26 Specifi-
cally, section 897, FIRPTA's principal provision,27 subjects foreign persons to 
U.S. taxation on dispositions of U.S. real property as if the gains were effec-
tively connected with a U.S. business, whether or not the taxpayer was actually 
engaged in such a business when the gain was recognized.28 Thus, the FIRPTA 
rule for taxing dispositions of directly held U.S. realty prevents foreign persons 
from avoiding federal income taxation on the disposition of U.S. real property 
by employing the installment sale technique.29 Section 897 also contains special 
nonrecognition rules that prevent attempts to circumvent FIRPT A by engaging 
in nonrecognition transactions (such as like-kind exchanges) in which property 
subject to FIRPT A is exchanged for property whose disposition would be free of 
U.S. tax.30 FIRPTA also deals with the ability to use tax treaties to avoid federal 
tax on dispositions of U.S. real property by overriding any conflicting treaty 
obligations that remain in effect four years after FIRPTA's enactment.Ji 
Section 897 tackles the corporate avoidance strategy in two different ways 
depending on whether a U.S. or foreign corporation is employed. For situations 
involving U.S. corporations, the provision generally taxes foreign persons on 
dispositions of stock in U.S. corporations whose assets significantly consist of 
U.S. real property.32 Consequently, the statute can reach gain realized by a 
foreign person on the disposition of stock pursuant to the liquidation of a U.S. 
realty holding corporation, as well as on the sale of the stock to another person. 
Where a foreign corporation is employed to hold U.S. real property, the statute 
brings on a mini-repeal of the General Utilities doctrine by generally causing a 
foreign corporation to recognize gain on the distribution of the realty or sale in 
connection with a liquidation.33 As a result, a disposition of U.S. real property 
via the sale followed by liquidating distribution route is taxable under section 
897. And while the sale of stock in a foreign corporation holding U.S. realty is 
not taxable under FIRPT A, the foreign seller can be expected to bear an indirect 
tax due to the receipt of a reduced sales price reflecting the corporation's future 
tax liability.34 
20See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511-12; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12-13. 
27FIRPTA also includes section 1445, which generally requires a purchaser of an interest in U.S. 
real property from a foreign person to withhold ten percent of the amount realized by the foreign 
person on the disposition. See 1.R.c. § 1445(a). In addition, FIRPTA provides the Treasury with 
authority to impose certain information reporting requirements, but at present there are no regula- . 
tions imposing these requirements. See I.R.C. § 6039C. 
"See I.R.C. § 897(a). 
2·See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
30See I.R.C. § 897(e). 
3lForeign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1125(c)(1), 94 Stat. 
2599, 2690 (not codified). 
32See 1.R.c. § 897(c)(1 )(A). 
"See I.R.C. §§ 897(d); 897(d)(2)(prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986). 
34See Charles D. Rubin and Robert F. Hudson, Federal Taxation of Foreign Investment in U.S. 
Real Estate, 912 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) at A-42 (2003). 
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B. Subsequent Tax Law Changes 
Since the enactment of FIRPT A, there have been several changes in the tax 
law that would have eliminated the ability to avoid U.S. taxon the disposition of 
U.S. real property through the use of the pre-FIRPTA techniques. Section 
864(c)(6), added in 1986,35 provides that the effectively connected status of 
deferred gain or income36 is to be determined as if the gain or income were taken 
into account in the year in which the underlying sale or other transaction oc-
curred, and without regard to whether the taxpayer is engaged in a U.S. l:iusiness 
for the year in which the gain or income is taken into account. Consequently, 
even without FIRPT A, taxpayers would not be able to avoid U.S: tax on disposi-
tions of U.S. real property used in business by engaging in installment sales of 
U.S. realty. Furthermore, the repeal of the GeneraL Utilities doctrine ("GU Re-
peal"), which also occurred in 1986,37 would have frustrated the pre-FIRPTA 
avoidance strategy of selling U.S. realty after adopting a plan of liquidation, 
followed by a liquidating distribution of the proceeds' to the foreign shareholder. 
Following GU Repeal, a liquidating corporation is required to recognize gain on 
a sale or distribution (as if the distributed property had been sold for its fair 
market value),38 thus defeating this technique for avoiding federal tax on the 
disposition of U.S. real property. Finally, the like-kind exchange rule was amended 
in 198939 to provide that U.S. and foreign real property are not like-kind prop-
erty.40 As a result, regardless of FIRPT A, a foreign person cannot avoid U.S. tax 
on a disposition of U.S. business real estate, by swapping the U.S. realty for 
foreign realty and then selling the foreign real estate. 
C. Method/or AnaLyzing the Continuing Need/or F1RPTA 
The effect of these legislative changes on the efficacy of the pre-FIRPT A 
avoidan'ce techniques raises the issue of whether the existence of FIRPT A con-
tinues to make sense as a policy matter. To this end, this Article examines two 
key features of FIRPT A: (i) the rules applying to' dispositions of directly held 
U.S. real estate, (ii)' and the rules applying to dispositions of sto~k in u.s-. 
corporations whose assets significantly consist of U.S. real estate.41 For each of 
"See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986) (codifying section 1242(a)). 
36'fhis provision also can apply to situations involving accelerated income . 
. 37See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986) (codifying section 631(a)). 
38See I.R.C. § 336(a). 
39See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 (1989) (codifying section 
7601(a)). 
4°I.R.C. § 1031 (h)(1). 
4'Section 897(g) contains another significant feature of FIRPTA that taxes a foreign person on the 
disposition of a partnership interest to the extent attributable to U.S, real property interests held by 
the partnership. With the ability of a purchaser of the partnership interest to step up the inside basis 
of the U.S. real property by electing section 754, this rule is necessary in order to ensure that gain on 
the U.S. realty does not escape U.S. tax. See Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 264. An 
analysis of this feature is beyond the scope of. this Article because the need for this provision is 
unaffected by subsequent changes in the tax law. Nevertheless, one may question on policy grounds 
whether the approach taken in section 897(g) (and the similar approach taken in Revenue Ruling 
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these features, this Article examines whether Congress's original purposes in 
enacting FIRPT A continue to justify the need for the particular feature. In doing 
so, this Article assumes that the original purposes are valid: the objective is to 
eliminate deadwood and the like, not to question CongreSs's original purposes 
for adopting the provisions.42 Consequently, if it is determined that the original 
purposes continue to justify the feature, this Article recommends retention of the 
rule. 
On the other hand, if it is determined that the feature is no longer necessary in 
light of its original purposes, then it still needs to be decided whether other 
policy objectives support the rule. There may be sound policy reasons for retain-
ing the feature even though Congress's original reasons for the rule have been 
mooted because of subsequent changes in. the tax law. In this regard, this Article 
considers the following funpamental policy concerns in the taxation of cross-
border business and, investment activities: equity, efficiency, administrability, 
I:!"eaty override, and harmonizing different countries' tax laws. For this purpose, 
equity refers to the type of horizontal equity concerns that underlie FIRPT A, 
that is, similarly taxing U.S. and foreign persons with respect to income that 
bears a sufficient economic connection to the United States;43 and efficiency 
refers to concerns .of competitive neutrality, also underlying FIRPTA, that aim 
to remove competitive advantages created by the tax law for foreign persons 
verses their U.S. co).mterparts.44 This Article also addresses these recognized 
1991-32, 1991-1 CB, 107, with regard to partnership assets used in a U,S, trade or business) is the 
appropriate solution, Cf Kimberly S. Blanchard, Extrastatutory Attribution of Partnership Activities 
(0 Partners, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 174-24(Sept. 9, 1997) (noting that as an alternative to the 
Revenue Ruling 1991-32 approach, Congress instead could deny a stepped-up basis to a purchaser of 
a partnership interest from a foreign person), 
"In this regard, there is some debate whether equity and efficiency concerns justify the adoption 
of FIRPTA, See STAFF OF TIlE JOINT COMM, ON TAXATION, supra note 24 (analyzing the equity 
justification for' FIRPT A irid disc.ussing other concerns that should be considered in evaluating 
FIRPTA on policy grounds); Richard L Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-
Owned Real Estate, 71 GEO. LJ. 1091.(1983) (criticizing the enactment of FIRPTA on policy 
grounds), Indeed, in 1986 the Senate passed a measure that would have repealed FIRPTA, but the 
bill was not adopted into law. See H.R. 99-3838, at part 2 § 952 (1986). The Senate Finance 
Committee advocated repeal because it believed that "FIRPTA is an undesirable impediment to 
foreign investment in U.S, real estate," and that the reduced demand lowers the price of U.S. real 
property "to the disadvantage of prospective U.S, sellers." S. REP. No. 99-313, at 430 (1986). 
43See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: International Aspects of United States 
Income Taxation 9-1\ (1987) (pointing out that in formulating rules for sourced-based taxation, 
fairness notions seem to require that foreign persons be treated the same as U.S, persons to the 
greatest extent possible); Blum, supra note 5 at 587 (noting the goal of equity in the U.S. taxation of 
foreign persons and U.S, persons); cf Stephen K Shay, j, Clifton Fleming, and Robert j, Peroni, 
What's Source Got to Do With It?, 56 TAX L REV. 81, 110 (2002) (proposing a criterion for 
structuring source-based taxation of nonresidents that provides that the level of taxation be compa-
rable to that imposed on residents earning the same income; basing such on the need for perceived 
parity in tax treatment of residents and nonresidents). 
"See Statement of Joseph H. Guttentag, International Tax Counsel, Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, 1997 TAX NOTES TODAY 196-25 (Oct. 7, 1997) (in discussing a change in the 
U.S. treaty policy with regard to REIT.dividends, pointing out that the Treasury should preserve a 
reasonable neutrality with respect to the taxation of foreign and U.S, persons, so that a potential U,S. 
investor in U,S real estate should not be outbid by a foreign person because of tax benefits provided 
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policy objectives in evaluating the need for a particular feature where there is 
uncertainty as to whether Congress's original purposes continue to justify the 
rule-that is, in situati~ns where some but not all of Congress's objectives are 
served without the partic:;ular feature as a result of subsequent legislative changes. 
As explained below, this analysis leads to the following conclusions. While it 
is somewhat unclear as to whether Congress's original reasons continue to jus-
tify the rule for directly held U.S. real estate, fundamental policy considerations 
call for the retention of this rule. On the other hapd, serious consideration should 
be given to eliminating the rules that apply to dispositions of stock in certain 
U.S. real property holding corporations: an original purpose analysis of these 
. rules is inconclusive, and a revised policy analysis suggests that the equity and 
efficiency benefits of ,the rules may not warrant the significant administrative 
costs involved. 
II. RULES FOR DISPOSITIONS OF DIRECTLY HELD 
U.S. REAL PROPERTY 
Section 897(a) provides that a foreign person's gain or loss from the disposi-
tion of a U.S. real property interest ("USRPI") is taken into account as if it were 
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business. The term USRPI includes 
directly held U.S. real property as well as certain U.S. realty interests held 
indirectly through U.S. corporations.45 The former category of USRPIs consist 
of interests in real property, that is, land and improvements, that are located in 
the United States or in the Virgin Islands, along with some items of associated 
personal property.46 Interests in real property for this purpose include fee simple 
interests, leaseholds, options, as well as interests in realty other than solely as a 
creditor, such as a right to share in the appreciation in the value of realty.47 In 
light of the subsequent statutory changes discussed above, this Part examines 
whether the direct USRPI rule continues to be justified on policy grounds. 
to the foreign person). In structuring source-based taxation of foreign persons by the United States, 
commentators have also expressed a concern over the tax law deterring foreign persons from invest-
ing in the United States, and accordingly have proposed a criterion providing that the tax not 
discriminate against foreign persons. See Shay, Fleming, and Peroni, supra note 43 at 110-112. 
Competitive neutrality is akin to capital import neutrality, and indeed the terms are sometimes used 
inter-changeably. See id. at 108; cf CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT 1. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD 
PuGH, TAXATION OF iNTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 196 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that concern with respect 
to capital import neutrality (among other concerns) has resulted in laws intended to increase the 
amount of U.S. tax imposed on foreign persons). However, capital import neutrality usually refers to 
the policy of not having U.S. tax law interfere with the ability of U.S. multinationals to compete with 
foreign taxpayers in foreign markets, See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, 
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1610 (2000) (noting the 
argument that capital import neutrality is necessary to preserve the relative competitiveness of U.S 
multinationals; questioning the overall merit of this argument). 
45See I.R.C. § 897(c)(I). 
46I.R.C. § 897(c); Reg,'§ 1.897-I(b)(I). 
47I.R.C. § 897(c)(6)(A); Reg. § 1.897-\ (d)(2). 
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A. Original Purpose Analysis 
As mentioned above, changes in the tax law after the enactment of FIRPT A 
call into question the continuing need for the direct USRPI rule. With the addi-
tion of section 864(c)(6), even without the direct USRPI rule it would no longer 
be possible to use the installment sale ~trategy .to obtain both U.S. net basis 
taxation during the operation phase and no U.S. taxation on the disposition of 
the U.S. realty. Likewise, the technique calling for a, like-kind exchange fol-
lowed by a sale of foreign replacement realty is noi vi~ble under current law 
given the fact that section 1031(h) .now provi\ie& that U.S. and foreign real 
property are not of like kind. The addition of section 864(c)(7) would also 
prevent the avoidance of U.S. tax through attempts to convert U:S. realty from a 
business use to an investment use prior to disposition:48 this provision would 
treat such property as if it were being used in a U.S: busirtess at the time of its 
disposition wher~ it is ~old within 10 years after the property ceased being used 
in a U.S. trade or business. Mo~eover, for the most part, .the treaty provisions 
that had allowed taxpayers an annual election to be taxed as a U.S. business no 
longer exist.49 Thus, with a few exceptions, regardless of FIRPT A, taxpayers 
.. . 
4·Although not mentioned in the committee reports accompanying the FIRPTA legislation, this 
wouid appear to be viable pre-FIRPTA strategy for obtaining net basis·.taxation and avoiding U.S. 
tax on the oisposition of the U.S. realty. 
490nly the U.S. income tax treaties with Greece and Trinidad and Tobago allow for an annual net 
election. See Income Tax Convention" Feb. 20,1950, U.s.-Greece; art. 8,5 U.S.T. 12; Income Tax 
Convent.ion, Jan. 9, 1970, U.S.-Trin. and Tobago, art. 15, 22 U.S.T. 164. All of the other U.S. 
treaties either do not provide for the net election or state that once the electi~n is made, it continues 
to apply unless the United States gives its consent to the revoke the • election .. See Income Tax 
Convention, May 14, 1953, U.S.-Aust!., art. 6,.4 U.S.T. 2264; Income Tax Convention, May 31, 
1996, U.S.-Aus., art. 6, T.f.AS. No. 10570;Income Tax Convention, De~. 31,1984, U.S.-Barb., art. 
6,22 U.S.T. 164; Income Tax Convention, July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg:, art. 6,23 U.S.T:2687; Income 
Tax Convention, July II, 1986, U.S.-Berm., TAX TREATIES (CCH)'II 1403,02 (no article dealing with 
real property); Income Tax Convention; Sept. 26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art. 6, T.I.A.S. No: 11087; 
Income Tax Convention, Apr. 30, 1984, U.S.-PRC., art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 12065; Income Tax Con-
vention, Mar. 19, 1984, U.S.-Cyprus, art. 15, 35 U.S.T. 4737; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 16, 
1993, U.S.-Czech Rep., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 2403.03; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 19, 
1999, U.S.-Den., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 2500.02; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 25, 1998, 
U.S.-Est., art. 6; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 24,1980, U.S.-Egypt, art. 7, 33 U.S.T. 1809; Income 
Tax Convention, Sept. 21,1989, U.S:-Fin., art. 6, T.I.AS.No. i2101; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 
31, 1994, U.S.-Fr., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 3001.04; Income-Tax. Convention; Aug. 29, 1989, 
U.S.-F.R.G., art. 6; Income Tax Convention, Feb. 12, 1979, U.S.-Hung., art. 6, 30 U.S.T. 6357; 
Income Tax Convention, May 7, 1975, U.S.-Ice., art. 15,26 U.S.T. 2004; Income Tax Convention, 
Sept. 12, 1989, U.SAndia, art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II'4203.05; Income Tax Convention, July II, 
1988; U.S.-Indon., art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 11593; Income Tax Convention; july 28, 1997, U.S.-Jr., art. 6, 
TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 4401.02; Income Tax Convention, Nov. 20, i975, U.S.-Isr., art. 7, TAX 
TREATIES (CCH) 'II 4603.05; Income Tax Convention, Apr. 17, 1984, U.S.-Ita1i, art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 
11064;Income Tax Convention, May 21, 1980, U.S.-Jam., art .. 6, 33 U.S.T. 2865; Income Tax 
Convention, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan, art. 15,)3 U.S.T. c;J67; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 24, 
1993, U.S.-Kaz., art. 9, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 5303.02; Income Tax Convention, June 4, 1976, U.S.-
Korea, art. 15, 30 U.S.T. 5253; Income Tax Convention, Jan.' 15; 1998, U.S.-Lat., art. 6, TAX 
TREATIES (CCH) 'II 5501.02; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 15, 1998, U.S.-Lith., art. 6, TAX TREATIES 
(CCH) 'II 5551.02; Income Tax Convention, Apr. 3, 1996, U.S.-Lux., ail. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 
5701.05; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. '6, T.I.A.S. No. 12404; Income 
Tax Convention, Aug. I, 1977, U.S.-Morocco, art. 6, 33 U.S.T. 2545; Income. Tax Convention, Oct. 
13,1993, U.S.-Neth., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 6103.04; Income Tax Convention, July 23, 1982, 
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would be unable to use treaty-based elections to obtain the net basis taxation/no 
tax on disposition result where the U.S. realty activities do not in fact amount to 
a U.S. trade or business.5o 
On the other hand, the direct USRPI rule is not completely superfluous as a 
result of the post-FIRPTA changes. In the absence of the direct USRPI rule, 
foreign persons would be able to avoid U.S. tax on the disposition of rental real 
estate-at the cost of gross basis taxation during the operations phase-for those 
situations where realty activities do not amount to a U.S. business, for example, 
the rental of U.S. realty subject to a net lease where an election is not made 
under the Code to treat the activity as a U.S. businessY The disposition of raw 
land also would escape U.S. taxation without the direct USRPI rule, as would 
sales of residences that are outside of the gain exclusion allowed under section 
121.52 In addition, the disposition of other direct USRPI that do not constitute 
property used in a U.S. business, such as options to acquire real property and 
certain noncreditor interests (for purposes of FIRPT A), would not be subject to 
U.S. tax without the rule. 
Consequently, in determining whether the direct USRPI rule continues to be 
justified in light of Congress's original purposes for adopting the rule, it is 
necessary to identify the precise purpose or purposes for the provision. FIRPTA's 
U.S.-N.Z., art. 6, 35 U.S.T. 1949; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Nor., art. II, 23 
U.S.T. 2832; Income Tax Convention, July I, 1957, U.S.-Pak., 10 U.S.T. 984 (no article dealing 
with real property); Income Tax Convention, Oct. I, 1976, U.S.-Phil., art. 7, 34 U.S.T. 1277; Income 
Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1974, U.S.-Pol., art. 7, 28 U.S.T. 891; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 6, 
1994, U.S.-Port., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 7803.04; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 4, 1973, 
U.S.-Rom., art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 165; Income Tax Convention, June 17, 1992, U.S.-Russ. Fed'n, art. 9, 
TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 8003.03; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1993, U.S.-Slovk. Rep., art. 6, TAX 
TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 8103.06; Income Tax Convention, June 21, 1999, U.S.-Slovn., art. 6, TAX TREA-
TIES (CCH) 'l! 8151.06; Income Tax Convention, Feb. 17, 1997, U.S.-S. Afr., art. 6, TAX TREATIES 
(CCH) 'l! 8201.06; Income Tax Convention, Feb. 22, 1990, u.S.-Spain, art. 6, 1591 U.N.T.S. 41; 
Income Tax Convention, Sept. I, 1994, U.S.-Swed., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 8801.06; Income 
Tax Convention, Oct. 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 9101.06; Income Tax 
Convention, Nov. 26, 1996, U.S.-Thail., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 9403.06; Income Tax Conven-
tion, June 17, 1985, U.S.-Tunis., art.6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,003.13; Income Tax Convention, 
March 28, 1996, U.S.-Turk., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,103.06; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 
4, 1994, U.S.-Ukr., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,303.13; Income Tax Convention, July 24, 2001, 
U.S.-U.K., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,900.06; Income Tax Convention, June 20, 1973, U.S.-
U.S.S.R. (no article dealing with real property), TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,603; Income Tax Conven-
tion, Jan. 25,1999, U.S.-Venez., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 11,103.06. 
50With regard to the treaties with Greece and Trinidad and Tobago, the United States should not 
have any difficulty in renegotiating these treaties so as to eliminate the annual net election provisions 
(should it desire to do so), given that these provisions are clearly out of step with current U.S. treaty 
policy. 
"See Rev. Rul. 73-522, 1973-2 C.B. 226 (rental property subject to a long-term net lease held not 
to constitute a U.S. trade or business); supra note 15 for the net basis election contained in sections 
871 (d) and 882(d). 
52Section 121 allows a taxpayer to exclude $250,000 (or $500,000, if married filing jointly) of 
gain from the disposition of a principal residence, provided that the taxpayer used the property as his 
principal residence for two of the previous five years (with the two-year holding period waived in a 
few situations). However, it is not clear whether section 121 would exclude gain that would other-
wise be taxable under section 897. See Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-49 to A-50 (discuss-
ing the arguments both for and against applying section 121 in connection with section 897). 
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legislative history suggests that the point of the direct USRPI rule is to prevent 
taxpayers from using the pre-FIRPTA techniques to obtain net basis U.S. taxa-
tion during the operations phase while avoiding U.S. tax on the disposition of 
the realty. This treatment often resulted in no U.S. tax liability with respect to a 
foreign person's U.S. real estate activities despite the presence of sizable eco-
nomic income. In this regard, the House and Senate reports accompanying 
FIRPTA state that "the United States should not continue to provide an induce-
ment through the tax laws for foreign investment in U.S. real property which 
affords the foreign investor a number of mechanisms to minimize or eliminate 
his tax on income from the property while at the same time effectively exempt-
ing himself from U.S. tax on the gain realized on the disposition of the prop-
erty."53 Therefore, it appears that the stated Congressional purpose for enacting 
the direct FIRPT A rule was limited to preventing the tax results that emanated 
from the use of the pre-FIRPTA avoidance techniques, nearly all of which are 
no longer possible54 given the subsequent changes in the tax law.55 
It is important to point out, however, that despite the focus of the committee 
reports, Congress has imposed U.S. tax on all directly held U.S. real property 
interests, not just those interests with respect to which the taxpayer received net 
basis U.S. taxation. In fact, the statute56 specifically includes options to acquire 
real property as interests subject to FIRPT A, even though an option holder will 
not receive net basis taxation while holding the interest. Moreover, the commit-
tee reports state that "it is essential to establish equity of tax treatment in U.S. 
real property between foreign and domestic investors."57 U.S. taxpayers are sub-
ject to U.S. tax on dispositions of U.S. real property regardless of the property 
being used in a U.S. business. Consequently, Congress's 'reference to tax equity 
may indicate that it was concerned not only with the avoidance strategies em-
ployed by foreign persons, but also with the ability of such persons to escape 
U.S. taxation on the disposition of U.S. realty that had never been used in a U.S. 
business. Nevertheless, it is arguable that even without the direct USRPI rule, a 
degree of tax equity does exist between U.S. and foreign investors who operate 
U.S. rental real estate in a nonbusiness capacity. That is, a foreign person's 
ability to escape U.S. taxation on the disposition of the realty may be substan-
tially offset by the harshness of gross basis taxation during the operations phase. 
However, in the absence of the direct USRPI rule, fqreign persons' dispositions 
of raw land, all residences, as well as options and other noncreditor interests in 
U.S. realty, would be outside of U.S. tax jurisdiction. Therefore, situations would 
S3H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12-13. 
s4While the annual net election is still available under two existing U.S. tax treaties, it should not 
be difficult to eliminate these unusual treaty provisions if Congress decides to repeal the direct 
USRPI rule. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
sSUnder this view of Congress's purpose, the taxation of gain on the disposition of directly held 
U.S. realty is not a goal in itself, but instead the means that Congress chose to remove the tax 
advantages experienced by foreign persons through the use of these techniques. 
s6LRC. § 897(c)(6)(A). 
S7See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12-13. 
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exist where foreign persons could receive economic income from U.S. real 
property that would not be subject to U.S. tax, an apparent violation of tax 
equity vis-a.-vis a similarly situated U.S. person. 
The foregoing examination of the legislative history of the direct FIRPTA 
rule indicates that Congress had a dual purpose for adopting' this rule. While it 
appears that Congress was mainly concerned with preventing foreign persons 
from avoiding all (or nearly all) U.S. tax on business operations involving U.S. 
real property, subjecting dispositions of interests in investment (and personal) 
realty to U.S. tax was a purpose for the rule as well. 
Based on this determination of the purposes underlying the direct USRPI rule, 
and despite the subsequent tax law changes, the rule still serves one of the 
Congressional purposes for its enactment, albeit probably a secondary one. How-
ever, a revised policy analysis of the rule should be undertaken because the 
direct USRPI rule now plays a diminished role in the taxation of a foreign 
person's U.S. real estate activities. The tax law is often a balance of competing 
policy objectives, and it needs to be determined whether the reduced benefits of 
the direct USRPI rule continue to justify its costs. 
B. Revised Policy Analysis 
As discussed above, the tax law changes since the enactment of FIRPT A have 
eroded the intended function of the direct USRPI rule to simply that of ensuring 
the U.S. taxation of a foreign person's disposition of interests in real property 
never used in a U.S. business.58 This section examines whether the direct USRPI 
rule, with its reduced role, is justified in light of the policies relevant to the 
taxation of foreign persons: equity,59 efficiency,60 administrability, and interna-
tional tax conCerns of treaty override and harmonization. 
1. Equity and Efficiency 
The direct USRPI rule continues to advance the horizontal equity concerns 
underlying FIRPTA by treating U.S. and foreign persons similarly on the dispo-
sition of U.S. real property interests that are held for investment or personal 
purposes. The direct USRPI rule also continues to promote the efficiency con-
cern of competitive neutrality by removing the competitive advantage previ-
ously experienced by foreign persons under the U.S. tax laws with respect to 
their holdings of investment or personal U.S. realty. As noted above, rough 
'"One possible, yet impractical exception to this description of the direct USRPI rule's role under 
current law is where a foreign person ceases using U.S. real property in a U.S. business and is 
willing to wait more than ten years before disposing of the realty in order to escape U.S. taxation on 
the disposition. This would result in a situation where, in the absence of the direct USRPI rule, the 
foreign person would avoid U.S. tax on the disposition under section 864(c)(7). It would appear, 
however, that this would be an unattractive technique for achieving the net basis taxation/no taxation 
on disposition results, given the substantial risk of fluctuations in the value of the realty during the 
ten year period. 
s'See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
roSee supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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equity would be achieved notwithstanding the direct USRPI rule with regard to 
foreign persons that hold rental real estate as an investment.61 Nevertheless, by 
pulling in raw land, options and noncreditor interests (for purposes of FIRPT A) 
such as loans with equity kickers, as well as personal residences,62 the direct rule 
promotes equity and efficiency. by imposing U.S. tax on the disposition of U.S. 
real estate interests that otherwise would likely be outside of the effectively 
connected income tax regime.63 
2. Administrability 
Tax administration is an important concern in the taxation of foreign (and 
U.S.) persons. While there are some tradeoffs, the overall effect of the direct 
USRPI rule is to simplify the tax law as it applies to U.S. real estate activities 
conducted by foreign persons. First, the direct USRPI rule obviates the need to 
determine whether a foreign person's U.S. real estate activities constitute the 
conduct of a U.S. trade or business for purposes of subjecting gain (or loss) on 
the disposition of the realty to the effectively connected income tax regime. 
Regardless of whether the activities amount to a U.S. business, section 897(a) 
will treat gain or loss from the dispositions of direct USRPIs as if the items were 
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business. Second, an indirect effect of 
the direct USRPI rule is to substantially obviate the need to make such a deter-
mination for purposes of applying the effectively connected regime to the opera-
tions phase of U.S. realty activities. This results because, with the direct USRPI 
rule, most foreign persons will elect to treat income-producing U.S. real estate 
activities as a U.S. business for purposes of applying the effectively connected 
rules.64 The net election always had a significant upside because it assured net 
basis taxation and thus deductions for depreciation, real estate taxes, and other 
expenses associated with the operation of income-producing real property. How-
ever, prior to FIRPT A there was a downside as well to making the election-
specifically, any recognized gain65 on the disposition of the realty would be 
61See supra text accompanying note 57. 
62As noted earlier, there is an issue as to whether section 121 could apply to exclude the gain on 
the sale of a principal residence notwithstanding the direct USRPI rule. See supra note 52. 
63With regard to certain noncreditor interests (for purposes of FIRPTA) in U.S. realty, there may 
be an issue as to whether they constitute partnership interests. See generally WILLIAM MCKEE, 
WILLIAM NELSON AND ROBERT WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS'll 3.03[3] 
(3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 200 I). If so and if the underlying realty is being used in a U.S. business, 
regardless of the direct USRPI rule, a foreign holder of such an interest should be subject to U.S. tax 
under the effectively connected regime on the income received through the holding or disposition of 
the interest. See 1.R.c. §§ 875(1), 864(c); Rev. Rul. 1991-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107. 
64See Christopher H. Hanna, Some Modest Simplification Proposals for Inbound Transactions, 56 
SMU L. REv 377, 384 (2003) (pointing out that it is almost always advantageous to make the 
election). 
65As mentioned earlier, a pre-FIRPTA technique used to avoid tax on the disposition of U.S. realty 
where an election had been made was to exchange the U.S. realty for foreign realty in a qualifying 
like-kind exchange, and then dispose of the foreign realty in a disposition that would be free of U.S. 
tax. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
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subject to U.S. tax whether or not the activities constituted a U.S. business.66 
The direct USRPI rule removed that downside as the election has no bearing on 
the taxation of the disposition under FIRPTA.67 Consequently, well-advised tax-
payers generally should make the net election. As a result, the effect of the direct 
USRPI rule is to significantly elimiQate the need to engage in a fact-based 
inquiry as to whether U.S. real estate activities are continuous, regular, and 
substantial enough to constitute a U.S. business. While the guidelines gleaned 
from cases and rulings regarding this inquiry are reasonably clear at either end 
of the spectrum, there appears to be a good deal of uncertainty in the middle 
because such determinations are factually based.68 
The direct USRPI rule does, however, add to the intricacy and uncertainty of 
the tax law through the rules for determining the types of noncreditor interests 
subject to FlRPTA. For example, the regulations apply the FIRPTA provisions 
to loans that give the lender any direct or indirect right to share in the profits 
generated by U.S. realty.69 The rule crea.tes uncertainty as to (i) whether this 
would cover a right to share in profits from a nonrealty business that uses some 
real property, and (ii) what constitutes an indirect right to share in such profits. 
In addition, a FlRPT A exemption for loans with indexed interest rates contains 
an exception for an interest rate that is tied to an index whose principal purpose 
is to reflect changes in real property values7°-a provision that has the potential 
for controversy. Nevertheless, the rules for loans with equity kickers appear to 
provide some offsetting administrative benefits, in that they may in some cases 
eliminate the practical need for determining whether such interests are disguised 
partnership interests for purposes of subjecting the foreign holder to the effec-
tively connected income rules. 71 Moreover, these rules presumably reflect a 
previous determination that the additional equity and efficiency achieved by 
subjecting these interests to U.S. tax warrants -the concomitant complexity, a 
determination that this Article assumes to be valid.72 
The rules governing the types of associated property subject to FIRPTA also 
add to the complexity of the law; nevertheless, for the most part these rules 
present administrative tradeoffs. That is, on one hand, the regulations for deter-
mining personal property associated with the use of real property contain several 
categories of property, each with intricate, fact-specific standards.73 These 
66Another potential downside at one time was the difference in the tax rate that would apply-30% 
if the election was not made verses rates as high as 70% for individuals and 48% for corporations 
with the election. See Hanna, supra note 64 at 383. With the highest individual and corporate tax 
rates now at 35%, there is no longer a tax rate downside in making the election. 
67See Hanna, supra note 64 at 384. 
6SSee Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-9 to A-IO; Hanna, supra note 64 at 382; American 
Law Institute, supra note 43 at 101; Richard Crawford Pugh, Policy Issues Relating to the U.S. 
Taxation of Foreign Persons Engaged in Business in the United States Through Agents: Some 
Proposals for Reform, I SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. I, 16 (2000). 
60See Reg. § 1.897-I(d)(2)(i). 
70See Reg. § 1.897-1 (d)(2)(ii)(D). 
"See supra note-63. 
72Cf supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
73See Reg. § 1.897-I(b)(4)(i). 
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regulations also provide for complex exceptions to FIRPTA's coverage of asso-
ciated personal property that focus on the timing of the disposition as well as the 
identity (related or not) and the intentions of the transferees of the personal 
property.74 Despite these exceptions, it appears that in many instances disposi-
tions of associated personal property are 'subject to the effectively connected 
regime in any event due to the general rules contained in section 864( c )(2) and 
(c)(3), or the look-back rules contained in sections 864(c)(6) and (c)(7), thereby 
reducing the need to grapple with these FIRPT A provisions. Further, in some 
situations the associated personal property rules may result in administrative 
benefits by substituting a specific category approach for a more nebulous fact-
based standard under the effectively connected income rules.75 
In addition, the presence of the direct USRPI rule simplifies the administra-
tion of a withholding mechanism for dispositions of U.S. real property.76 Even if 
Congress decided to eliminate the direct USRPI rule, it would still likely require 
tax withholding on dispositions of U.S. realty that are otherwise subject to the 
effectively connected regime, specificaily, realty that had been used in a U.S. 
business. The perceived enforcement difficulties that led Congress to adopt the 
FIRPT A withholding rules77 would likely remain, even with a tax limited to 
dispositions of business realty.78 Yet, without the direct USRPI rule, it would be 
necessary to require someone79 to make the determination as to whether or not 
the realty is, or was, U.S. business property, an inquiry that would complicate 
the administration of such a withholding requirement. 
3. International Tax Concerns 
Other important concerns in the taxation of foreign persons relate to obliga-
tions under treaties and limitations that arise out of the desire to harmonize the 
income tax laws of different countries. 
74See Reg. § 1.897-1 (b)(4)(ii). 
"See I.R.C. § 864(c)(2); Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2), (c)(3). 
76As previously mentioned, section 1445 generally requires a transferee of a USRPI from a foreign 
person to withhold ten percent of the amount realized on the disposition. See I.R.C. § 1445(a). 
"See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF 
THE DEFICIT REDUcnON ACT OF 1984, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., P.L. 98-369, 406 (Jan. 23, 1984) 
(stating that a major problem with ARPT A as first enacted (under which the tax was not due until a 
return was filed) was that it could be easily evaded by a foreign person removing the proceeds from 
U.S. realty dispositions beyond the jurisdiction of the United States). 
78In this regard, section 1446 is an example of a withholding mechanism applying to a foreign 
person's U.S. business income, specifically, a foreign partner's distributive share of partnership 
income that is effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business. This provision was enacted because 
of the perceived enforcement difficulties with regard to a foreign partner who may not be present in 
the United States. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., P.L. 99-514,1055 (Comm. Print 1986). 
79As indicated by the existing withholding rules under the Code and regulations, a determination 
such as this could be made by the withholding agent (compare section 1446 regarding the partnership's 
determination of a foreign partner's distributive share of effectively connected income of the part-
nership), the Service (compare section 1445( c) and Regulation section 1.1445-3 regarding the Service~ s 
determination of a taxpayer's maximum tax liability on a disposition of a USRPI), or even the 
taxpayer (compare section 1441 and Regulation section I. I 441-4(a) regarding a taxpayer's claim of 
effectively connected status for purposes of a withholding exemption). 
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Although more than 20 years have elapsed since the enactment of FIRPT A, it 
still may be relevant to consider the extent to which the provisions conflict with 
the United States' obligations under income tax treaties. Of the 55 current in-
come tax treaties, the United States entered into 12 of them prior to the adoption 
of FIRPT A.8o Consequently, it is possible that features of the legislation con-
tinue to conflict with the obligations contained in a significant number of trea-
ties; and where FIRPTA conflicts with a treaty, the legislation provides that the 
statute will prevail as of January I, 1985.81 Congress presumably determined 
that the equity and efficiency benefits of FIRPT A outweigh the negative conse-
quences of overriding existing treaty obligations.82 However, given the reduced 
equity and efficiency benefits stemming from the direct USRPI rule, this issue 
should be reconsidered. Nevertheless, all of the existing pre-FIRPT A treaties 
permit the United States to tax a foreign person on gain derived from the dispo-
sition of a direct interest in U.S. real property.83 And while the direct USRPI rule 
appears to be broader than most of these treaties in that it also pulls in certain 
noncreditor interests and associated personal property, Congress has presumably 
determined that the additional equity and efficiency achieved by taxing these 
items justifies overriding treaties to this extent-a determination that this Article 
does not disturb.84 
The direct USRPI rule also appears to be generally consistent with the tax 
laws of most other countries. That is, countries typically cede tax jurisdiction 
with respect to their residents (through either foreign tax credit mechanisms or 
territorial systems) over gain derived from direct real property holdings located 
in another country.85 As a result, the direct USRPI rule should not pose a signifi-
80See Treaties Ratified and Entered into Force, 2002, 5 I 3-14, TAX TREATIES (CCH). 
81Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § I I 25(c)(I), 94 Stat. 
2599,2690 (not codified). 
82Indeed, the delayed treaty override by FIRPTA indicates that Congress certainly considered the 
impact on existing U.S. treaty obligations. Cf DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INV. IN U.S. 
REAL ESTATE 53-54 (1979) (Treasury study leading to FIRPTA points out that in contemplating 
changes to the tax law treaty obligations must be taken into account; stating that there should be 
considerably less international objection to prospective override of treaties). Nevertheless, an issue 
exists as to whether Congress struck the appropriate balance in deciding that the original equity and 
efficiency benefits of FIRPT A outweigh the concerns with overriding treaty obligations. See Kaplan, 
supra note 42 at 1122 (seeing the concerns relating to treaty override as possibly a countervailing 
factor to any equity basis for FIRPT A). 
83See Income Tax Convention, July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg., art. 6, 23 U.S.T. 2687; Income Tax 
Convention, Feb. 20, 1950, U.S.-Greece, art. 8,5 U.S.T. 12; Income Tax Convention, Feb. 12, 1979, 
U.S.-Hung., art. 6, 30 U.S.T. 6357; Income Tax Convention, May 7, 1975, U.S.-Ice., art. 15, 26 
U.S.T. 2004; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan, art. 15,23 U.S.T. 967; Income Tax 
Convention, June 4, 1976, U.S.-Korea, art. 15, 30 U.S.T. 5253; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 3, 
1971, U.S.-Nor., art. 11,23 U.S.T. 2832; Income Tax Convention, July I, 1957, U.S.-Pak., to 
U.S.T. 984 (Senate reservation to art. (4); Income Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1974, U.S.-Pol., art. 7, 28 
U.S.T. 891; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 4, 1973, U.S.-Rom., art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 165; Income Tax 
Convention, Jan. 9, 1970, U.S.-Trin. and Tobago, art. 15,22 U.S.T. 164; Income Tax Convention, 
June 20, 1973, U.S.-U.S.S.R., TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'lI 10.603 (no article prohibiting such taxation). 
84Cf supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
85See American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 37-38 (1987) (pointing out that it is traditional 
throughout the world to source gain derived from real property in the country where the real property 
is located). 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57. No.2 
WITHER FIRPT A? 311 
cant risk of double taxation,86 a concern that underlies the desire to harmonize 
the tax laws of different countries. 
4. Evaluation 
The revised policy analysis indicates that despite the subsequent changes in 
the tax law, the direct USRPI rule should be retained. The rule continues to 
advance the Congressional goal of equitably and efficiently taxing foreign and 
U.S. persons with respect to U.S. real estate activities, albeit to a lesser extent 
with the post-FIRPT A changes. Moreover, the direct USRPI rule serves to sim-
plify the taxation of foreign persons' U.S. realty operations and is generally 
consistent with both U.S. treaty obligations and the tax laws of other countries. 
In addition, as recommended by the American Law Institute87 and others,88 the 
tax law should be further simplified and improved by eliminating the net basis 
election for U.S. real estate and instead providing that all income from U.S. real 
estate be treated as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business. Since 
taxpayers generally should be making the election, the recommended approach 
will avoid the trap for the unwary that currently appears to exist.89 Moreover, 
this approach would eliminate the paperwork attending the election,90 as well as 
obviate the difficult, fact-based inquiry regarding trade or business status that 
can arise in the rare cases where the election is not made under current law.91 
III. RULES FOR DISPOSITIONS OF STOCK IN U.S. CORPORATIONS 
THAT HOLD U.S. REAL PROPERTY 
Besides direct USRPIs, FIRPT A taxes a foreign person on the gain from the 
disposition of stock (and other noncreditor interests) in certain U.S. corporations 
holding U.S. real property. Specifically, the definition of USRPI also includes 
any interest (other than an interest solely as a creditor) in any U.S. corporation, 
unless the taxpayer establishes that the corporation was not a U.S. real property 
holding corporation ("USRPHC") at any time during 'the shorter of the period 
that the foreign person held the interest or the five-year period ending on the 
86 Although the direct USRPI rule may go a bit further than is typical, by including certain 
noncreditor interests and associated personal property, again, it is presumed that Congress has 
previously decided that the additional equity and efficiency achieved warrants the greater risk of 
double taxation involved. Cf supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
81See American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 101-102. 
"See Pugh, supra note 68 at 16; cf. Hanna, supra note 64 at 383-384 (recommending that 
nonbusiness income from U.S. real property be treated as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or 
business unless the foreign person elects otherwise). 
89See American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 101; Hanna, supra note 64 at 384. 
90See Hanna, supra note 64 at 383-384 (describing what must be included on the statement 
attached to the return if the election is made; pointing out that his recommendation will minimally 
reduce paperwork by eliminating substantially the need to make the election); American Law Insti-
tute, supra note 43 at 102 (pointing out that eliminating the election will avoid the IRS warehousing 
of election forms). 
9'See American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 101-102 (pointing out that eliminating the election 
will obviate the need for well-advised taxpayers to examine what can be murky case law). 
Tax Lawyer. Vol. 57, No.2 
312 SECTION OF TAXATION 
date of the disposition of the interest ("testing period").92 A corporation is a 
USRPHC if the fair market value of the corporation's USRPIs equals or exceeds 
50% of (i) its USRPIs, (ii) its interests in foreign real property, plus (iii) any 
other of its assets that are used or held for use in a trade or business.93 
-Exceptions from the FIRPT A tax are provided for stock in publicly traded 
corporations (in general),94 stock in domestically-controlled REITs,95 and for 
dispositions of stock in a USRPHC where the corporation at th~ time of the 
disposition did not hold any USRPIs and any such interests held during the 
testing period were disposed of in fully taxable transactions.96 In addition, a 
disposition of stock in a foreign corporation is not taxable under FIRPT A.97 
There is a considerable amount of statutory and regulatory machinery needed 
to implement the USRPHC rules. Among these rules are methods for determin-
ing the fair market value of property;98 an alternative book value test for USRPHC 
status;99 provisions for determining which assets are used or held for use in a 
trade or business;loo complex provisions for determining when a corporation 
must be tested for USRPHC status;lOl look-through rules for controlling interests 
in other corporations and interests in partnerships, estates and trusts;102 and pro-
cedures for establishing that a corporation is not a USRPHC. 103 In addition, the 
regulations provide backstops to the USRPHC rules through special 'nonrecogni-
tion rules that impose a toll charge on certain distributions of USRPIs by a 
foreign corporation that follow dispositions of the foreign corporation's stock, 
apparently because the effect of such transactions can be similar to a transfer of 
stock in a USRPHC. 104 The regulations also employ other special corporate 
nonrecognition rules that seem to be aimed at preventing taxpayers from trans-
ferring U.S. realty interests in corporate solution without a current tax. 105 
As discussed previously, GU Repeal raises the issue of whether the USRPHC 
rules remain necessary as a policy matter. This Part analyzes this issue by first 
examining the original purposes for the USRPHC rules. After concluding that it 
is uncertain as to whether the original purposes continue to justify the USRPHC 
92l.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
9Jl.R.C. § 897(c)(2). 
94I.R.C. § 897(c)(3). Excluded from this exception are persons who hold, both actually and con-
structively, more than five percent of the class of stock during the testing period. I.R.C. § 897(c)(3), 
(c)(6)(C). 
9sl.R.C. § 897(h)(2). A domestically-controlled REIT exists where during the testing period, less 
than 50% by value of the REIT stock is held directly or indirectly by foreign persons. 
96I.R.c. § 897(c)(1)(B). 
97I.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(4)(A). 
98Reg. § 1.897-1(0). 
99Reg. § 1.897-2(b)(2). 
'OOReg. § 1.897-1 (f). 
'O'Reg. § 1.897-2(c). 
102l.R.C. § 897(c)(4), (c)(5); Reg. § 1.897-I(e), -2(e). 
'OJReg. § 1.897 -2(g), (h). 
'(}<Temp. Reg. § 1.897-5T(c), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403. 
IOsSee Temp. Reg. § 1.897-6T(a), (b). 
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rules, this Part then proceeds by considering fundamental policies relevant to the 
taxation of foreign persons. 
A. Original Purpose Analysis 
Regardless of the USRPHC rules, GU Repeal derails ·the pre-FIRPTA tech-
nique involving U.S. corporate ownership of U.S. real property. That is, net 
basis U.S. taxation for realty operations and no U.S. taxation on the disposition 
of the real property can no longer be achieved. Under this pre-FIRPT A tech-
nique, the foreign person could dispose of the U.S. realty by having the corpora-
tion sell the realty after adopting a plan of liquidation, followed by a liquidating 
distribution of the sale proceeds to the foreign shareholder. However, since the 
repeal of old section 337 in 1986, the U.S. corporation would recognize any gain 
(or loss) on the sale in connection with the liquidation, thus subjecting gain on 
the disposition to U.S. tax. If the foreign investor instead were to sell stock in 
the corporation to the purchaser, who then liquidated the corporation in order to 
receive the U.S. real property with a stepped-up basis, new section 336(a) (added 
in 1986) would cause the corporation to recognize any gain (or loss) on the 
liquidating distribution as if the property were sold to the distributee for its fair 
market value. 
Nevertheless, without the USRPHC rules, a foreign person holding stock in a 
USRPHC could, in theory, sell the stock to a purchaser who does not intend to 
liquidate the corporation, and avoid an immediate U.S. tax on the gain inherent 
in the underlying USRPI. While the purchaser would likely pay a reduced price 
for the stock, given the lack of a stepped-up basis in the corporate assets, the 
discount should be less than the amount of an immediate corporate tax in light of 
time value of money considerations. Consequently, despite GU Repeal, the 
USRPHC rules continue to ensure that the disposition of stock in a USRPHC is 
subject to an immediate U.S. tax, rather than what amounts to a discounted tax. 
At issue then is whether the USRPHC rules with their more limited role 
continue to be justified in light of the original purposes for the rules.106 On the 
one hand, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended the USRPHC 
rules to prevent a tax-free disposition of U.S. real property that provides the 
purchaser with a stepped-up basis in the property. In describing the pre-FIRPTA 
corporate technique to obtain the benefits of current net basis taxation and ex-
emption from tax on gain, both the House and Senate Reports provide an ex-
ample involving the liquidation of a corporation holding U.S. realty as a step in 
the ultimate tax-free disposition of the realty via a stock sale.107 Thus, it appears 
that Congress assumed that a disposition of corporate-held real property by way 
I06In this regard, it is clear that the USRPHC rules are not designed as a second level of tax on 
gain derived from U.S. corporate real estate. See Blum, supra note 5 at 669-670. Although some-
times a second tax occurs, section 897(c)(l)(B) provides an exception to the FIRPTA tax on disposi-
tions. of USRPHC stock where the corporation has already incurred a tax on all of the USRPIs that it 
held during the testing period. 
10
7See H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510-511; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12. 
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of a stock sale would entail the liquidation of the corporation.108 This, in tum, 
suggests that the USRPHC rules were intended to prevent the favorable tax 
consequences occurring in these situations. 109 
Additional support for this view may be found in the treatment of foreign 
corporations and REITS under FIRPT A. Dispositions of stock in foreign corpo-
rations are not subject to FIRPT A, but instead foreign corporations are generally 
taxable under FIRPT A on distributions of USRPIs to shareholders. I 10 The FIRPT A 
treatment of domestically-controlled REITS is similar to that of foreign corpora-
tions. III Thus, these provisions provide further indication that in adopting the 
corporate FIRPTA rules, Congress intended to prevent tax-free corporate distri-
butions of U.S. real property that gave the shareholder a stepped-up basis in the 
distributed property. The rules for foreign corporations and domestically-
controlled REITS also imply that at least in these situations, Congress was not 
concerned with imposing an immediate tax on a disposition of stock in a real 
property holding corporation, absent a corporate distribution of U.S. realty. 
The fact that Congress chose to combat the corporate avoidance strategy by 
taxing the disposition of stock in a USRPHC, rather than taxing the corporate 
distribution, does not necessarily contradict this purpose. GU Repeal was still 
several years away. And while it may have been possible for Congress to mini-
repeal the General Utilities doctrine just for distributions of U.S. real property 
by U.S. corporations (and sales of U.S. realty by liquidating corporations),112 
such a corporate-level tax would have been borne by both the foreign and U.S. 
shareholders of the corporation. Similarly, denying the purchaser a stepped-up 
basis for the U.S. realty upon liquidationll3 would have resulted in a lower 
purchase price for all of the shareholder~. Thus, such measures may not have 
advanced the equity and efficiency goals of FIRPT A by ensuring that foreign 
persons bear the burden of the additional tax. 114 In addition, there may have been 
108C! Diane Renfroe, Andre Fogarasi, Richard Gordon, and John Venuti, 1989 Tax Bill: Taxing 
Foreign Investors on Capital Gains, 44 TAX NOTES 1415, 1419 (Sept. 18, 1989) (the drafters of 
FIRPTA assumed that a purchaser of stock in a foreign corporation holding U.S. real estate would 
want to liquidate the corporation to obtain a stepped-up basis in the underlying realty). 
[()9It is entirely possible that had Congress considered the situation involving a stock disposition 
with no liquidation in a post-GU Repeal world, it may have decided that effectively imposing a 
discounted tax sufficiently advances FIRPTA's equity and efficiency goals. As discussed earlier, it 
appears that Congress mainly was concerned with the ability to avoid all (or nearly all) U.S. taxation 
through a combination of net basis taxation during operations and ewmption from tax on the gain 
upon disposition. See supra notes 6-23 and accompanying text. 
iiOI.R.C. § 897(c)(I)(A)(ii), (d)(I). 
lllSee I.R.C. § 897(h)(2), (h)(3). 
112C! DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 82 at 53 (apparently suggesting the possibility of targeted 
GU Repeal, as opposed to taxing sales of corporate stock, in order to combat the pre-FIRPTA realty 
holding corporation technique). 
ll3C! id. (apparently suggesting the possibility of eliminating the step-up in basis to the purchaser 
upon liquidation, as opposed to taxing sales of corporate stock, in order to combat the pre-FIRPTA 
realty holding corporation technique). 
ii4FIRPTA's mini GU Repeal for foreign corporations may not present a similar problem in that it 
would appear unlikely for a U.S. person to hold stock in a foreign real property holding corporation. 
See infra notes 178-188 and accompanying text. Also, GU Repeal for distributions of 
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administrative reasons why Congress chose not make taxation dependent on the 
occurrence of a liquidation in connection with the stock disposition, as such a 
requirement would necessitate intent or timing tests that would further compli-
cate the application of the USRPHC rules. Consequently, a tax on the disposi-
tion of USRPHC stock may have been Congress's only acceptable and viable 
option for imposing tax on a sale of U.S. real property that had been held in U.S. 
corporate solution. 115 
On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that Congress also intended to 
impose an immediate tax, rather than a discounted tax, on dispositions of stock 
in USRPHCs where a liquidation is not contemplated. The USRPHC rules im-
pose tax on a qualifying stock disposition regardless of whether there is a corpo-
rate distribution of U.S. real property. Moreover, for situations involving foreign 
corporations, Congress originally intended to use a shareholder tax as well,1I6 
but retreated presumably because of jurisdictional and enforcement concerns 
over taxing foreign persons on dispositions of foreign stock. 1I7 Consequently, 
the evolution of the FIRPTA rules for foreign corporations may weaken the 
implication that Congress was not concerned with imposing an immediate tax on 
a disposition 'of foreign corporate stock absent a corporate distribution of U.S. 
real property. It may also be possible to explain the exception from the USRPHC 
rules for domestically-controlled REITs as a countervailing inducement for for-
eign persons to invest in U.S. real estate. lIS The domestically-controlled require-
ment may tie in to this rationale given that this requirement seems to ensure that 
income tax planning for foreign persons would not dominate the REIT's invest-
ment and distribution policies.1I9 Thus, Congress may have recognized that the 
law's failure to tax a disposition of USRPHC stock, even in the absence of a 
liquidation, also created a loophole that it generally wanted to close. 120 
USRPIs by domestically-controlled REITS only applies to the extent of the foreign-owned percent-
age of the REIT (see LR.C. § 897(h)(3)); consequently, it would appear to be possible for regulations 
to allocate General Utilities gain to the foreign shareholders of the REIT (the REIT being a pass-
through entity), although there are no regulations providing for this treatment. Cf Arthur A. Feder 
and Lee S. Parker, The Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980,34 TAX LAW. 545, 568 
(1981) (suggesting the possibility of devising such regulations). 
115Thus, taxing dispositions of USRPHC stock may not have been a goal·in itself, but instead the 
means chosen by Congress to eliminate the tax advantages of the pre-FIRPTA corporate technique. 
116See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511-512; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 13-14; 
H. REp. No. 1479 (Conf. Rep.), 1980-2 C.B. 583, 584. 
117See Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-42; Renfroe, Fogarasi, Gordon, and Venuti, supra 
note 108 at 1419; Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 262. 
118See Feder and Parker, supra note 114 at 567. The legislative history to FIRPTA provides no 
reasons for this treatment. 
119See Carl Estes, II, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate through REITS, 7 TAX MGT. REAL 
EST. J. (BNA) 103 (June 5, 1991). 
121Yfhis desire may have prompted Treasury to propose the forerunner of the USRPHC rules, rather 
than the measures it first recommended that apparently called for targeted GU Repeal and denial of a 
stepped-up basis in the U.S. realty to the purchaser upon corporate liquidation (see supra notes 112-
113). See Taxation of Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. 
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The preceding analysis suggests two possibilities regarding Congress's pur-
pose for enacting the USRPHC rules. One possibility is that Congress intended 
to tax foreign persons on dispositions of U.S. real property held in U.S. corpo-
rate solution that provided the purchaser with a stepped-up basis in the U.S. 
realty: that is, dispositions that are carried out either by having the corporation 
sell the U.S. realty after adopting a plan of liquidation, or by having the foreign 
investor sell stock in the corporation followed by a liquidating distribution of the 
realty to the purchaser. With this as the purpose, GU repeal should call for the 
elimination of the USRPHC rules in the absence of other sound policy objec-
tives. 121 A secondary purpose for the USRPHC rules may have been to tax a 
foreign person on a sale of USRPHC stock even where there is no liquidation of 
the corporation to ensure that such dispositions are subject to full, rather than 
discounted, U.S. tax. Assuming this is the case, the USRPHC rules continue to 
serve a Congressional purpose despite GU Repeal. Nevertheless, it is still ques-
tionable whether the benefits of serving this secondary purpose warrant the costs 
involved because the main purpose for the USRPHC rules would be achieved in 
any event. Consequently, under either view of the purposes underlying the 
USRPHC rules, scholars and policymakers should examine other recognized 
policy concerns to determine whether the rules continue to be justified. 
B. Revised Policy Analysis 
This section examines whether the continuing benefits of the USRPHC rules, 
whether or not intended by Congress, warrant the costs involved. In doing so, 
this Article again considers the policies relevant to the taxation of foreign per-
sons: equity, efficiency, administrability, and international tax concerns. In ap-
plying the equity and efficiency criteria, this Article assumes the propriety of the 
current policy under which foreign persons are generally not subject to two 
levels of U.S. tax on their gains attributable to property held in U.S. corporate 
solution.122 
On Taxation and Debt Mgmt., 96th Congo 144, 153 (1979) [hereinafter Hearing) (statement of 
Marshall J. Langer, attorney) (stating that the central concern of the Treasury proposal is to prevent 
foreign investors from avoiding U.S. tax by engaging in tax-free sales of stock in U.S. real estate 
holding corporations; characterizing that fear as "unrealistic and unfounded" if the tax-free step-up 
in basis is eliminated, in light of the fact that there would be a discounted purchase price and very 
few buyers for the shares). 
I2IC! Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 264 (stating that with the GU Repeal, there is no 
need for section 897 to tax dispositions of U.S. stock, and thus FIRPTA can be greatly simplified); 
Statement of National Foreign Trade Council to House Ways and Means Comm., supra note 5 
(calling for the repeal of FIRPTA, given that with the GU Repeal, there is no significant potential for 
foreign persons to avoid U.S. tax on U.S. real estate by liquidating U.S. realty holding corporations, 
and FIRPTA causes significant complexity and potentially inhibits foreign investment). 
122See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this point. Commen-
tators have legitimately questioned whether this aspect of source taxation results in the fair and 
neutral treatment of foreign investors verses their U.S. counterparts. See Shay, Fleming, and Peroni, 
supra note 43 at 145 (calling for a reexamination of the general exemption from source taxation of 
gains on the sale of stock in U.S. corporations). It is important to point out that if foreign persons 
were generally subject to U.S. tax on gains from the sale of stock in U.S. corporations, this should 
render the USRPHC rules superfluous. See Blum, supra note 5 at 675 (calling for the repeal of the 
USRPHC rules if U.S. tax is imposed generally on U.S. stock gains of foreign persons). 
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1. Equity and Efficiency 
a. In GeneraL. Whether or not Congress intended this to be the case, the 
USRPHC rules may advance horizontal equity by imposing an immediate tax, as 
opposed to whatis effectively a discounted tax, on a foreign person's disposition 
of stock in a USRPHC where the corporation is not liquidated. A goal of FIRPT A 
is to promote equity of tax treatment with regard to U.S. real estate between U.S. 
and foreign investors. I23 U.S. persons are subject to a full tax upon an ownership 
change in U.S. realty, whether held directly or in corporate solution. Without the 
USRPHC rules, however, a foreign person potentially could experience a lower 
effective tax liability on such a change in ownership by selling stock in a U.S. 
corporation that holds U.S. real estate. 124 Likewise, the immediate tax caused by 
the USRPHC rules may advance efficiency by removing the competitive advan-
tage that foreign persons may otherwise experience under the U.S. tax laws with 
respect to acquisitions of U.S. real estate. 125 
I23See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
124See Blum, supra note 5 at 670 (pointing out the continuing role that the USRPHC rules play 
after the GU Repeal is to ensure that the FIRPT A tax cannot be delayed beyond the time of an 
ownership change in the U.S. corporation holding the U.S. real estate); cf Feder and Parker, supra 
note 114 at 565-66 (discussing and illustrating the lower effective tax that is imposed on sales of 
stock in foreign corporations holding U.S. real estate as a result of the exception to the USRPHC 
rules for dispositions of foreign stock). 
125It should be noted that with respect to equity and efficiency in connection with the ownership of 
U.S. real estate, the USRPHC rules have the potential for imposing an immediate tax on more than 
just USRPIs, given the general 50% threshold for USRPHC status. See Feder and Parker, supra note 
114 at 556-558 (pointing out the USRPHC rules can operate in a capricious way by taxing stock 
sales where far less than a majority of a U.S. corporation's holdings by value <;onsist of USRPIs; and 
that the gain on the stock sale may relate solely to appreciation in non-USRPIs held by the corpora-
tion). 
The USRPHC rules may also advance equity and efficiency by providing a possible basis for 
taxing a foreign person on a long position in an equity swap with respect to USRPHC stock. Under 
an equity swap, a foreign person would enter into an arrangement with a shareholder of a USRPHC 
where at the end of each year, the shareholder pays the foreign investor an amount equal to the sum 
of distributions on the USRPHC stock during the year, plus any increase in the value of the stock 
occurring over the year, and the foreign person pays the shareholder an amount equal to an interest 
rate multiplied by the value of the USRPHC stock at the beginning of the year,. plus any decrease in 
the value of the stock occurring over the year. See Rubinger, Can a Total Return Equity Swap Avoid 
FIRPTA?, J. TAX'N FIN. PRODUCTS (Spring 2003). Even though the foreign person's position is 
economically equivalent to a leveraged purchase of USRPHC stock, it is not clear whether FIRPTA, 
as currently formulated, applies to this situation. See id. Specifically, the position in the swap may 
not constitute an "interest other than solely as a creditor" in a USRPHC within the reach of section 
897(a). See id. Moreover, even if the position is treated as an interest subject to FIRPT A, the 
payments made under the swap may not constitute amounts received in the disposition of a USRPHC 
interest, which is required in order to be taxable under the statute. See id. Whatever the result under 
current law, the repeal of the USRPHC rules would likely eliminate any basis for taxing the foreign 
person on an equity swap. Nevertheless, it may be possible to advance equity and efficiency in this 
situation even without the USRPHC rules. If the USRPHC is a C corporation, then the swap 
payments received by the foreign investor (which are based on the change in the value of the 
USRPHC stock as well as distributions paid with respect to the stock) should reflect the tax liability 
on the appreciation and income at the USRPHC level. Thus, the foreign person should bear an 
effective U.S. tax on such payments. If however, the corporation is an S corporation, then the 
corporate income that passes through to the actual shareholder should be offset by a deduction for 
the payments made to the foreign person pursuant to the swap. Cf Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(l), (d), (e)(3) 
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The following example illustrates and attempts to quantify the difference 
between an immediate tax and an effective, discounted tax where a foreign 
person disposes of stock in a USRPHC. Assume that a foreign corporation owns 
all of the stock of a U.S. corporation whose only asset is improved U.S. real 
estate with a fair market value of $5,000,000 and an adjusted basis of $3,000,000. 
Assume also that the U.S. corporation is subject to U.S. tax at a flat rate of 35%. 
If the U.S. corporation were to sell the real estate for $5,000,000 and then 
liquidate, the foreign corporate owner would indirectly incur a U.S. tax of 
$700,000,126 leaving $4,300,000 after federal income taxes. Now assume that the 
USRPHC rules are repealed. If the foreign corporation is able to locate a buyer 
who is willing to purchase the stock of the U.S. corporation and not liquidate the 
company,127 the foreign corporation would be able to avoid an immediate tax on 
the disposition of the corporate-held real estate. However, it can be expected that 
the buyer would reduce the purchase price by at least an amount equal to the 
present value of the tax attributable to depreciation deductions that will be lost 
due to forgoing an increase in the basis of the real estate.128 Assuming that (i) all 
of the foregone basis is depreciable, (ii) the recovery period for the property is 
40 years (and the buyer intends to hold the realty for this period), and (iii) the 
discount rate is five percent, a reduction in the purchase price to reflect the lost 
depreciation should amount to approximately $300,000. 129 Consequently, with 
(referring to net deductions from a notional principal contract, which includes equity swaps). There-
fore, in the absence of a special rule, the foreign person would not bear an effective U.S. tax on the 
swap payments where an S corporation is used. Rather than retain the USRPHC rules for this 
situation (which may not tax equity swaps in any event without other changes in the law), Congress 
could devise a rule that taxes the foreign person on these swap payments by treating the foreign 
investor as a constructive shareholder of the S corporation (but not for purposes of the corporation 
qualifying as an S corporation); under this approach, the foreign person would be taxed on her share 
of the S corporation's effectively connected income, including any net gain from dispositions of 
USRPIs, like that which occurs with respect to foreign persons holding partnership interests. A rule 
similar to the approach used in section 897(g) and Revenue Ruling 1991-32 (see supra note 41) 
could be employed as well to tax the foreign person upon any disposition of the swap position. 
Indeed, because an equity swap can also involve synthetic interests in partnerships and LLCs (see 
supra Rubinger n.5), any approach that relied on the USRPHC rules would not be comprehensive in 
taxing these equity swaps. 
126.35($5,000,000 - $3,000,000) '= $700,000. Upon the liquidation, the foreign corporation would 
not be taxed under FIRPTA on any gain realized on the disposition of the stock in the U.S. corpora-
tion because of the exception contained in section 897(c)(l)(B). See supra note 96 and accompany-
ingtext. 
12'The next subsection of this Article discusses the likelihood of this occurring. 
128Indeed, the buyer will probably insist on further reductions in the purchase price to reflect a 
share of the seller's tax benefit, as well as to compensate the buyer for taking on the risk of unknown 
corporate liabilities. Cf Irwin D. Segal, Eli Fink and Craig Stem, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real 
Estate: No Perfect Structure, 9 1. INT'L TAX'N 22,28 n.28 (May 1998) (noting that it would serve as 
a good negotiating position for a stock sale if the seller is willing to reduce the sales price by an 
amount that is greater than present value of the tax attributable to the lost depreciation deductions). 
129With straight-line depreciation, forgone basis of $2,000,000 would yield $50,000 of deprecia-
tion deductions per year for 40 years. With a tax rate of 35%, these deductions would generate 
$17,500 of tax savings per year. The present value of $l7,500 paid at the beginping of each year for 
40 years, using a discount rate of 5%, is approximately $300,000. If the buyer :had intended to hold 
the U.S. real estate for less than its full recovery period, the reduction in the purchase should be 
larger; this is because the foregone increase in basis would have been recov/:rable sooner upon a 
subsequent disposition of the U.S. realty. 
I 
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the repeal of the USRPHC rules, the foreign corporation may be able to receive 
$4,700,000 as compared to $4,300,000 after taxes under current law, a sizable 
difference. 13o 
As the example demonstrates, the discounted tax that could apply with the 
repeal of the USRPHC rules would be based on the tax rates applying at the 
corporate level, which do not contain a capital gains preference (and are as high 
as 35%).131 In contrast, a U.S. individual could receive the benefit of the rate 
preference for capital gains (which is a maximum of 15% in general and 25% 
for unrecaptured section 1250 gain)132 where the U.S. realty is held either di-
rectly or through a pass-through entity (such as a limited liability company). 
Consequently, even with the repeal of the USRPHC rules, a foreign person may 
experience an effective tax rate that is similar to the tax rate applying to a U.S. 
individual on U.S. realty gains.133 Moreover, there are other differences in the 
U.S. tax treatment of foreign and U.S. persons that are relevant to an equity and 
efficiency analysis of the USRPHC rules. As pointed out by Treasury in its 1979 
study of the taxation of foreign investment in U.S. real estate, a U.S. person may 
have a greater ability than a foreign person to use tax losses that are generated 
by U.S. real estate activities; that is, a U.S. person would be able to use the 
losses to shelter other U.S. income, but a foreign person may have not have any 
other U.S. income that can be sheltered. 134 Granted, the differences in the ability 
to use losses may matter less today with the current depreciation lives for re~ 
alty135 and the addition of the passive loss rules.136 Nevertheless, these factors 
suggest that repealing the USRPHC rules and imposing a discounted tax on a 
foreign person's disposition of USRPHC stock may not necessarily produce a 
])OAs noted earlier, additional reductions in the purchase price are likely. See supra note 128. 
131See LR.C. §§ II and 1201(a). 
I32See LR.C. § I (h). 
\33The facts of the previous example bear this out. With the repeal of the USRPHC rules, the 
foreign investor is subject to an effective tax rate of IS% on the gain from the disposition of the U.S. 
realty «$S,OOO,OOO minus $4,700,000) divided by $2,000,000 (the amount of gain». (There are 
likely, however, to be further reductions in the purchase price. See supra notes 128, 129). A U.S. 
individual holding the realty either directly or through a pass-through entity would also be subject to 
a tax rate of IS%, assuming the none of the gain was unrecaptured 12S0 gain (and that the realty was 
not dealer property). 
I34See DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 82 at SO. Indeed, the Treasury study includes an analysis of a 
hypothetical investment which showed that a foreign investor would bear a heavier tax burden than a 
similarly situated U.S. investor if the foreign investor was subject to tax on U.S. realty gain (and 
could make only limited use of her U.S. real estate losses). See id. at 48-SI. The Treasury study 
concluded that because some differences favor foreign taxpayers and others favor U.S. taxpayers, 
whether foreign persons are better or worse off tax wise than U.S. persons depends on the particular 
circumstances of the investment and investor. See id. at SI. It should be noted that foreign persons 
could use techniques to enhance their ability to deduct real estate losses, for example, by placing 
other U.S. investments in a USRPHC or holding several USRPHCs in a consolidated group. See id.; 
George F. Bernardi. A Foreign Investor's Tax Guide to Real Property Investments in the United 
States, 20 INT'L TAX J. 39.69 (Fall 1994). 
\35See LR.C. § 168(c) (recovery period for residential rental property and nonresidential real 
property being 27.S years and 39 years, respectively). 
])·See LR.C. § 469. In this connection, the passive loss rules do not apply to widely-held C 
corporations, and they apply liberally to closely-held C corporations with respect to their active (that 
is, non-portfolio) income. See LR.C. § 469(a)(2), (e)(l), (e)(2). 
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lighter U.S. tax burden for foreign persons versus their U.S. counterparts, along 
with the resulting equity and efficiency costs. 
According to Congress, the USRPHC rules apparently do not advance recog-
nized policies simply because a tax may be imposed on a foreign person's sale 
of stock in a U.S. corporation. Such a tax arguably promotes equity (and effi-
ciency) vis-a-vis U.S. investors in U.S. corporate stock who effectively bear two 
levels' of U.S. tax on their gains attributable to corporate-held property (at the 
corporate and shareholder levels). However, except for the USRPHC rules (and 
a few rare situations), I37 the Code does not tax a foreign person on dispositions 
of U.S. stock, and Congress has rejected attempts.to do so within the last dozen 
years. 138 Moreover, the exception from the section 897 tax for situations where a 
U.S. corporation's USRPIs were previously taxed indicates that the USRPHC 
rules were not designed to impose a second level of tax on gain attributable to 
appreciation in corporate-held real estate.139 Most well-advised foreign investors 
are able to avoid the tax under the USRPHC rules by using this exception. 140 
Nevertheless, sometimes the USRPHC rules may impose a second level of tax 
on corporate-held property (real estate and/or other assets as weU).141 For ex-
ample, tax may be imposed on the disposition of a minority stock interest where 
the shareholder lacks the necessary control to have the corporation satisfy the 
exception contained in the USRPHC rules. To this extent, the USRPHC rules 
appear to' conflict with recognized principles. 142 
b. Extent of USRPHC Stock Sales if the Rules Were Repealed. Notwithstand-
ing the above analysis addressing the potential equity and efficiency benefits of 
the USRPHC rules, the rules do not advance equity and efficiency to the extent 
that a foreign person would be subject to an immediate tax on U.S. realty 
dispositions absent the rules. That is, a repeal of the USRPHC rules may only 
create a loophole to the extent that foreign persons can enjoy such a 100phole. 143 
I37See, e.g., l.R.C. § 871(a)(2): 
138See H.R. 101-3150, Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1989, pt. I § 11404 (1989); H.R. 102-5270, 
Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplication Act of 1992 (1992); H.R. 104-2491, Balanced 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995, § 12882 (1995). At least with respect to publicly-traded stock, 
administrative considerations are at least partly responsible for the general exemption for stock sales. 
Cf Blum, supra note 5 at 645-648 (discussing the administrative burdens in taxing sales of publicly-
traded stock); DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 82 at 52-53 (pointing out that measures needed to 
enforce compliance with respect to a tax on stock sales would seriously burden the market); Shay, 
Fleming, Peroni, supra note 43 at 122 (noting the exception for stock gains is justified on the 
grounds that the source country lacks a strong claim to tax, and to administer such a tax via 
withholding, information regarding basis would be needed; concluding, however, that the exemption 
rests largely on administrative and enforcement considerations). 
139See supra note 106. 
140See Blum, supra note 5 at 674 (pointing out that any well-advised foreign investor will avoid 
the tax on USRPHC stock); cf. Kathleen Matthews, FlRPTA Regulations Unfairly Subject Share· 
holders to Double Taxation on Inbound Reorganizations, 42 TAX NOTES (TA) 1166 (March 6, 1989) 
(witness at IRS hearing commenting that in a post-GU Repeal world, no one is going to sell stock in 
a USRPHC). 
141Because of the 50% threshold contained in the USRPHC test, the section 897(a) tax on disposi-
tions of U.S. stock can apply to gain that is , attributable to corporate as-sets other than U.S. real estate. 
See Feder and Parker, supra note 114 at 558. 
142 See Part III~B.I.f for a further discussion of this point. 
143See Blum, supra note 5 at 671. 
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In order to benefit from a repeal of the USRPHC rules, a foreign person would 
have to hold U.S. real property in a USRPHC and then dispose of the USRPHC 
stock to avoid a corporate-level tax. That is, a foreign person must engage in a 
stock sale without a taxable liquidation of the corporation to benefit from a 
repeal of the USRPHC rules. l44 Consequently, in evaluating the equity and effi-
ciency benefits of the USRPHC rules, it is important to consider the extent to 
which this would occur if the rules were eliminated. 
Nonresident aliens traditionally hold U.S. real estate in a corporate structure. 
This structure typically requires the nonresident alien to own stock in a foreign 
corporation that in turn would own stock in a U.S. corporation that holds the 
U.S. real estate. 145 Structuring the holding of U.S. real estate in this manner 
ensures that the nonresident alien will not be subject to the U.S. estate tax, given 
that stock in a foreign corporation is not includable in the gross estate of a 
nonresident alien. 146 In addition, using a tax haven/foreign corporation with 
bearer share certificates would provide the foreign investor with a greater degree 
of home country anonymity than alternative structures for investing in U.S. real 
estate. 147 By using a U.S. corporation to hold the U.S. real estate as opposed to a 
foreign corporation, this structure also avoids the impositiori of the branch prof-
its tax 148 on the income produced by the realty operations. 149 While any divi-
dends paid by the U.S. corporation would subject the shareholder to U.S. tax, the 
timing and extent of such taxable dividends can be controlled, unlike the nearly 
1""See id. 
1"See Robert E. Hudson, Current Techniques/or Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate-Income 
and Estate Tax Considerations, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L (TA) 3027, 3028, 3039 (200\); See Steven A. 
Musher, Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 From the Perspective of the Foreign Investor in U.S. 
Real Estate, 6 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. 1. 67 (1990). 
146LR.C. § 2104(a). 
147See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3039; cf Bernardi, supra note 134 at 88 (noting that in general, 
using a certain structure that employs tax haven holding corporations apparently may offer the best 
solution to reduce U.S. taxes). Nonetheless, foreign investors from countries that have treaties with 
United States may choose instead to use home country corporations in order to take advantage of 
treaty provisions that override or modify U.S. tax law. See supra Hudson. As discussed below, home 
country/ treaty corporations may be used to ov~rride the branch profits tax. See infra note 149. Even 
without branch profits tax protection, a foreign investor from a treaty country may still prefer using a 
home country corporation in tandem with a U.S. subsidiary to obtain the benefit of treaty provisions 
that eliminate or reduce the U.S. withholding tax on interest paid by the U.S. subsidiary to the treaty 
parent corporation. See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3042. Howeve,r, potential drawbacks with this 
approach (besides the loss of home country anonymity) include limitations on the U.S. subsidiary's 
ability to deduct interest under the earnings stripping rules (section 163(j», as well as the fact that 
the home country tax rate on the interest payments may be higher than the tax rate applicable in the 
United States. See id. 
148The branch profits tax imposes a 30% tax on a foreign corporation's dividend equivalent 
amount, which is defined generally as the corporation's effectively connected earnings and profits 
minus (plus) the corporation's increase (decrease) in U.S. net equity for the particular taxable year. 
See LR.C. § 884(a), (b). 
1491f the foreign investor is from a country that has a treaty with the United States that overrides 
the application of the branch profits, the foreign investor may want to forego interposing a U.S. 
corporation and instead have a home country corporation directly hold the U.S. real estate. See 
Hudson, supra note 145 at 3040; Sarah O. Austrian and Willys H. Schneider, Tax Aspects of Foreign 
Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 45 TAX LAW. 385,432-433 (1992). In this regard, many older U.S. 
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automatic nature of the branch profits tax. 150 For the same reason, a foreign 
corporate investor typically would prefer to hold U.S. real estate through a U.S. 
corporation. 
There appears to be, however, increasing interest in using noncorporate struc-
tures for holding U.S. real estate by foreign persons. 151 An advantage of holding 
real estate either directly or through a limited partnership (or limited liability 
company) is lower income tax rates. 152 Although the payment of dividends may 
be minimized, the corporate holding structure results in two levels of U.S. tax to 
the extent that profits are remitted from the U.S. realty operations, whereas a 
direct interest or a partnership structure only involves one level of U.S. tax. 153 
Perhaps more importantly, a sale of U.S. realty that is held by a nonresident 
alien, either directly or through a pass-through entity, would benefit from prefer-
ential capital gains rates, the maximum rate typically being 15%.154 In contrast, 
a sale of realty by a U.S. corporation would be subject to the regular corporate 
rates that can be as high as 35%.155 A noncorporate structure, however, may 
implicate the estate tax. 156 Despite some risk, commentators have referred to 
authority for treating a partnership interest as non-U.S. situs property.157 Regard-
less of whether the partnership is engaged in a U.S. business, such a character-
ization would exempt nonresident alien investors from the U.S. estate tax. 158 
Further, commentators also point out that techniques exist for avoiding estate tax 
exposure. 159 Given the income tax advantages, if the planned repeal of the estate 
income tax treaties override the branch profits tax (some exceptions being the treaties with Australia, 
Canada, and France). See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3040. However, a foreign investor who uses a 
home country corporation to hold U.S. real estate will lose home country anonymity, and if such 
anonymity is critical, then the tandem foreign parentIV.S. subsidiary structure (using a tax haven 
corporation) would probably be the better choice. See id. at 3040-3041. 
150See Michael Hirschfeld and Shaul Grossman, Opportunities for the Foreign Investor in U.S. 
Real Estate-If Planning Comes First, 94 J. TAX'N 36, 38-39 (2001). 
151See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3028. 
I52See id. at 3028-3029. 
I53See id. Generally speaking, the difference between corporate and noncorporate holding struc-
tures is reduced somewhat by the application of the new maximum tax rate of 15% that applies to 
dividends paid by U.S. corporations (and certain foreign corporations) to individuals. See I.R.C. 
§§ I (h) (I ), (II). However, this maximum tax rate on dividends does not apply to dividends received 
by foreign individuals that are subject to tax under the FDAP regime contained in section 871(a), 
which is the case in this situation. 
15'See I.R.c. § I (h). 
155See I.R.C. § II. 
156See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3029. 
157See id. at 3030-3034; cf Michael 1. A. Karlin, Richard A. Cassell, Carlyn S. McCaffrey, and 
William P. Streng, U.S Estate Planning for Nonresident Aliens Who Own Pannership Interests, 
2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 116-36 (June 16,2003) (reviewing authorities and theories for determining 
whether a partnership interest in U.S. situs property for purposes of the U.S. estate tax). 
158See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3030. 
159See id. at 3030-31, 3045-46.(pointing out that a nonresident alien should be able to avoid the 
U.S. estate tax by gifting the partnership interest; referring also to the use of split-interest partner-
ships to mitigate or eliminate the risk of estate tax exposure); but cf Karlin, Cassell, Cave, McCaffrey, 
and Streng, supra note 157 (indicating that there is some U.S. gift tax risk with gifting the partner-
ship interest to avoid the estate tax, in light of the Service's position of not ordinarily ruling on 
whether a partnership interest is excludable intangible property for purposes of the gift tax). 
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tax 160 is made permanent, a noncorporate structure should be the preferred way 
for holding U.S. realty by nonresident aliens. 
It appears that any preference for a noncorporate holding structure would be 
unaffected by eliminating the USRPHC rules. Substituting what effectively con-
stitutes a discounted tax for an immediate tax in the corporate situation would 
likely not offset the advantages in the noncorporate situation of a single level of 
tax on operating income and a capital gains tax on appreciated real estate. 
Moreover, as discussed below,t61 there likely would be obstacles to disposing of 
the realty by selling the USRPHC stock and thus obtaining the benefit of the 
discounted tax . 
. Assuming that a foreign person does employ a corporate structure for holding 
U.S. real estate, the question then becomes to what extent would the repeal of 
the USRPHC rules lead to dispositions of the realty through U.S. stock sales 
rather than asset sales. One obstacle to stock sales would be tax considerations. 
While it can be expected that the purchaser would pay a reduced price for the 
USRPHC stock to make up for the lack of a stepped-up basis in the realty, some 
buyers apparently would rather receive a stepped-up basis than attempt to quan-
tify the future tax liability through a purchase price adjustment. 162 Moreover, the 
potential would still exist for two levels of federal tax on future income and 
future gain from the corporate realty.163 A U.S. individual buyer might avoid two 
levels of tax by electing S corporation status for the USRPHC,I64 although there 
would be the potential for additional subchapter S taxes if the corporation has 
accumulated earnings and profits from its days as a C corporation.165 Further, an 
S corporation that purchases the USRPHC stock could elect to treat the USRPHC 
as a branch for tax purposes. 166 A partnership or LLC as the buyer of the USRPHC 
stock could not, however, avail itself of the S corporation election. 167 Neverthe-
less, a publicly-traded U.S. corporation or partnership might be an eligible 
160See l.R.C. § 2210(a). 
161 See infra notes 162-173 and accompanying text. 
162Cf William H. Newton III, Structuring Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 50 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 517, 518 (1996) (noting that despite the ARPTA exception for dispositions of stock in a 
foreign corporation, disposition of a USRPI by a foreign corporation is typically necessary for a 
prospective buyer to obtain a stepped-up basis in corporate assets (as well as to avoid unknown 
corporate liabilities)). 
163ln theory, the purchase price could be further reduced to reflect this additional future tax 
liability, but practically it would be' difficult to quantify these future tax costs. Moreover, with these 
added costs of continued corporate ownership of the realty, there may be no overall tax savings 
resulting from a stock sale verses an asset sale that can be shared by the parties. 
I"'See Blum, supra note 5 at 672 (pointing out that to avoid a corporate tax under section 1374 on 
the built-in gain on the real estate, a corporate sale of the real estate would have to be delayed for 
more than ten years after the S election is made). 
165See I.R.C. §§ 1362(d)(3), 1375. In addition, some states do not recognize S corporation status. 
See Blum, supra note 5 at 672-673. 
166See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3) (allowing this qualified subchapter S subsidiary election for 100% 
owned subsidiaries) . 
. 167See l.R.c. § 1361(b)(1)(B) (generally excluding persons other than individuals as eligible S 
corporation shareholders). 
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purchaser of stock in a USRPHC given that these entities already face two levels 
of tax on their income. 168 And, a foreign person might be willing to buy stock in 
a USRPHC because a corporate holding structure may be advantageous in light 
of the U.S. estate tax (and branch profits tax).169 However, a foreign buyer might 
also accept stock in a foreign corporation that holds U.S. realty through a U.S. 
corporation, and dispositions of foreign stock are not subject to FIRPT A. 170 
Consequently, the repeal of the USRPHC rules may not open up any loophole 
that already does not exist, 17l a point that is expanded upon in the next subsec-
tion of this Article. 
A second and perhaps more important obstacle to such stock sales would be 
the general aversion to purchasing real estate in corporate solution because of 
the concern over unknown corporate liabilities. I72 Indeed, even though a sale of 
stock in a foreign real estate holding corporation is exempt from FIRPT A, a sale 
of foreign stock does not appear to be a popular technique for disposing of the 
underlying realty.173 Consequently, it appears that for both tax and nontax rea-
sons, not many buyers would be willing to acquire U.S. real estate by purchasing 
stock in a USRPHC and refraining from liquidating the company. 
c. Ability to Avoid the USRPHC Rules by Selling Stock in a Foreign Corpo-
ration. The preceding analysis suggests that the equity and efficiency costs of 
repealing the USRPHC rules' may not be significant due to tax arid non tax 
limitations on the ability of foreign persons to enjoy any resulting loophole. The 
equity and efficiency costs of eliminating the USRPHC rules may be further 
minimized to the extent that a foreign person can avoid the rules by disposing of 
corporate-held U.S. real estate by selling stock in a foreign corporation-a dis-
position that is exempt from FIRPT A. 174 Consequently, in evaluating the equity 
and efficiency benefits of retaining the USRPHC rules, it is important to deter-
mine to what extent a foreign person can avoid an immediate tax on a disposi-
tion of corporate-held U.S. real estate by taking advantage of this existing gap in 
FIRPTA.175 
168Both types of entities are taxed as C corporations. See LR.C § 1361(b)(l)(A) (limit of 75 
shareholders in order to elect S corporation status); LRC § 7704(a) (publicly-traded partnerships 
treated as corporations). 
169In the case of a nonresident alien, such a purchase should be through a foreign corporation. See 
supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text. 
l70See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
l7lSee Blum, supra note 5 at 673-674. 
172See, e.g., id. at 672; Newton, supra note 162. 
173See Musher, supra note 145; Newton, supra note 162; Segal, Fink, and Stem, supra note 128; 
William J. Bricker, Structuring Foreign Investments in U.S. Real Property: United States Tax As-
pects, 430 PLIffAX 391, 476 (1998). This may be due in part to the tax treatment of a U.S. person 
who purchases stock in a foreign corporation, and the greater concern over unknown corporate 
liabilities with regard to the tax haven corporations that are typically used to indirectly hold USRPls. 
These aspects are discussed in the next subsection. 
174See supra note 97.' 
175Cf Feder and Parker, supra note 114 at 565-566 (analyzing the tax benefit that a foreign person 
can obtain by using the foreign stock exception to the USRPHC rules and stating that the treatment 
offoreign stock sales may be "a partial gap in FIRPTA's otherwise solid front"). 
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As discussed above, nonresident aliens that use the corporate structure to hold 
U.S. real estate typically would hold stock in a foreign corporation which in tum 
holds stock in a USRPHC. 176 As a result, even with the USRPHC rules, a 
nonresident alien can avoid an immediate U.S. tax on an ownership change in 
the realty by disposing of stock in the foreign corporation. 177 However, for tax 
reasons U.S. persons would probably not be willing to purchase stock in such a 
foreign corporation. 17s U.S. individuals (either directly or through pass-through 
entities such as partnerships) would probably not want to hold U.S. realty in this 
manner because of the possibility of three levels of U.S. tax on the operating 
income generated by the real estate activities: a tax at the USRPHC level,179 a 
second U.S. tax on dividends paid by the USRPHC to the foreign corporation, ISO 
and a third U.S. tax either automatically through one of the Code's anti-deferral 
regimes lSI or on dividends paid by the foreign corporation to the U.S. individu-
als. IS2 While such a purchaser could liquidate the foreign corporation to prevent 
a level of tax on distributed profits, the liquidation would result in a corporate 
level tax on the gain inherent in the USRPHC stockls3 (which should reflect the 
appreciation in the underlying realty). Consequently, a liquidation would pro-
duce an immediate U.S. tax, thus defeating any tax reason for engaging in a 
stock sale. Similarly, the prospect of multiple U.S. taxation of operating profits 
would likely deter U.S. corporations and publicly-traded U.S. partnerships from 
holding U.S. real estate in foreign corporate solution. l84 And, the liquidation of 
the foreign corporation by a U.S. corporation or partnership that acquires the 
stock in the foreign corporation would be a taxable event. Although it is gener-
ally possible to have a tax-free liquidation of a foreign corporation that is at least 
80% owned by a U.S. corporation (which would include a publicly-traded U.S. 
partnership),IS5 the Treasury and Service have issued regulations that tax the 
17°See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text. A foreign corporate investor typically would 
hold U.S. real estate through a USRPHC in order to avoid the application of the branch profits tax on 
the operating income produced by the real estate activity. See supra notes 148-150 and accompany-
ing text. 
I77See Segal, Fink, and Stem, supra note 128 at 28 (discussing the possibility of a sale of foreign 
stock, but also pointing out that for tax and nontax reasons buyers will generally prefer asset 
acquisitions). And a foreign corporate investor in U.S. real estate could do the same by interposing 
another foreign corporation between itself and the USRPHC. 
I78See Blum, supra note 5 at 651-652 (pointing out that a U.S. person would not want to purchase 
stock in a foreign corporation having a U.S. subsidiary unless the foreign corporation can be liqui-
dated tax free). As discussed above, a stock purchase, whether it be foreign or U.S. stock, may also 
be deterred for nontax reasons, that is, the concern over unknown corporate liabilities. See supra 
notes 172-173 and accompanying text. Indeed, there would probably be an even greater concern in 
purchasing stock in the tax haven corporations that are typically used to indirectly hold USRPls. 
I79See 1.R.c. § II. 
180See 1.R.c. § 881(a). 
181See 1.R.c. §§ 951(a), 952(a)(2), 954(a)(l), (c)(l)(A), (c)(3)(A)(i) (subpart F rules); I.R.C. §§ 1293, 
1297 (PFlC rules); I.R.C. §§ 551, 552 (foreign personal holding company rules). 
1821.R.C. § I. 
1831.R.C. §§ 336(a) and 897(a),(c),(d). 
184e! supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text. 
1851.R.C. §§ 332(a), 337(a), 897(d)(2). 
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foreign corporation upon such a liquidation on the gain realized by the foreign 
seller on the sale of the foreign corporation's stock to the U.S. corporation. 186 
The regulations also tax other techniques for eliminating the foreign corpora-
tion l87 or effectively converting it into a U.S. corporation for purposes of 
FIRPTA.188 
On the other hand, a foreign buyer may be willing to accept stock in a foreign 
corporation, assuming that the corporate holding structure is preferred, the buyer 
is willing to forego a stepped-up basis in the underlying U.S. real estate (and 
other corporate assets) in return for a reduced purchase price, and the buyer is 
not dissuaded from engaging in a stock acquisition because of liability concerns. 
While such a structure potentially would result in two levels of U.S. tax on the 
operating profits from the real estate activities, it is assumed that U.S. estate tax 
and branch profits tax considerations dictate the use of a corporate structure. 189 
Therefore, under the very conditions that would allow a foreign person to enjoy 
the gap that would be created by the repeal of the USRPHC rules,190 it may be 
possible to avoid the rules in any event by selling foreign stock to a foreign 
person. 191 Consequently, it can be argued that retaining the USRPHC rules 
186See Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(2), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403. 
18'See Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(4), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403 (C, D, and F 
reorganizations); Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(3) (section 355 distributions). 
1"See Reg. § 1.897-3(c)(5), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 c.B. 403 (election by a 
foreign corporation under section 897(i) to be treated as a U.S. corporation for purposes of FlRPTA). 
1.9See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text. 
1905ee supra notes 162-173 and accompanying text. 
1915ee Segal, Fink and Stem, supra note 128 at 28, n.28 (noting that it should not be impossible to 
sell foreign stock where the seller is willing to share some of tbe tax savings resulting from FlRPT A 
not applying to the disposition; pointing out, however, that buyers generally prefer asset acquisitions 
of U.S. real estate); Bernardi, supra note l34 at 82 (pointing out tbat a tax advantage with a certain 
structure for holding a USRPHC through a tax haven (known as an "open-face Dutch sandwich") is 
tbat the ultimate foreign investors can sell the stock in the foreign holding corporations free of the 
FlRPTA withholding tax); cf Renfroe, Fogarasi, Gordon, and Venuti, supra note 108 at 1419, 1424-
1425 (pointing out that to postpone a proposed U.S. tax on gain derived by a ten percent foreign 
shareholder from a disposition of stock in a U.S. corporation, a foreign investor could transfer tbe 
U.S. stock to a foreign holding corporation and then sell tbe stock in the foreign corporation). It 
should be noted tbat a special nonrecognition rule appears to be aimed at restricting a foreign 
person's ability to use tbe foreign stock exception. Specifically, Regulation section 1.897-6T(b) 
denies nonrecognition treatment on a foreign corporation's transfer of a USRPI to another foreign 
corporation (a transaction that normally may receive nonrecognition treatment under section 351 or a 
reorganization provision), unless eitber (i) tbe exchange qualifies as a type C (in general), acquisitive 
D, or F reorganization (as described in section 368), or (ii) the property transferred is stock in a 
USRPHC, the exchange qualifies under section 351 or section 354 (in connection with a B reorgani-
zation), in general, and tbe recipients of tbe foreign stock received in tbe exchange refrain from 
selling tbe stock for at least three years following tbe exchange. In addition to these requirements, 
for nonrecognition treatment to occur, in general, either (i) none of tbe foreign corporations involved 
would have been USRPHCs if they were U.S. corporations, (ii) the transferee corporation is from a 
treaty country that has an exchange of information agreement with the United States and the trans-
feree corporation waives all treaty benefits, (iii) the transferee corporation is a qualified resident (as 
defined in section'884(e)) of-its home country, (iv) the transferee and transferor corporations are 
from the same country and that country has a treaty with the United States tbat contains an exchange 
of information provision, or (v) tbe transferee and transferor corporations are from tbe same country 
and tbe exchange is an F reorganization. This rule prevents a foreign corporation with several 
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results in no equity and efficiency benefits.l92 
The USRPHC rules may alternatively advance equity and efficiency by effec-
tively limiting the stock acquisition technique to sales to foreign buyers. Given 
that a stock acquisition may be unattractive from a liability standpoint,I93 limit-
ing the technique to sales to foreign persons may make it more difficult to find a 
willing buyer of stock, and thus the number of such transactions may be consid-
erably lower than without the USRPHC rules. The difficulty in finding a buyer 
of stock may well be exacerbated by the increased concern over unknown li-
abilities with respect to the tax haven corporations that are typically used to hold 
USRPHCs. Furthermore, with only foreign persons as potential buyers of stock, 
this may depress the price paid for the stockl94 (in addition to any reduction 
because of a lack of stepped-up basis in the corporate real estate), thereby 
making this technique unattractive from the standpoint of the seller as well. 195 
Countering this to a degree is the existence of what seems to be a global market 
for U.S. real estate;196 almost all of the major brokerage firms have worldwide 
properties from making a nontaxable transfer of a USRPI to anotber foreign corporation in anticipa-
tion of selling the stock of tbe transferee foreign corporation. Compare Reg. § 1.897-6T(b)(4), 
example (1) (nonrecognition denied where a foreign corporation transfers a directly-held USRPI to 
its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary under section 351(a)) with example 2 (nonrecognition permitted 
where a foreign corporation transfers substantially all of its assets, including all of its USRPIs, to 
another foreign corporation under section 361(a) in an acquisitive D reorganization, where the 
transferor and transferee foreign corporations are from tbe same country and this country has a treaty 
with the United States that contains an exchange of information provision). Consequently, to tbis 
extent the rule limits the ability to use tbe foreign stock exception to the USRPHC rules. Nevertbless, 
a foreign person could avoid the need to comply witb tbis rule by holding each USRPI (either 
directly or indirectly) through a separate foreign corporation. Cf Bernardi, supra note 134 at 65-67 
(recommending that USRPIs be held in separate U.S. corporations in order to allow foreign investors 
to buy and sell several properties without incurring a second level of U.S. tax (on a dividend) upon 
distributing the proceeds of the sale of a USRPI). 
1925ee Blum, supra notes 5 at 673-74 (stating that because a foreign person's disposition of stock 
in a foreign holding company is free of U.S. tax, "the repeal of [the USRPHC rules] would not open 
up any loophole tbat did not already exist"); cf Dale, supra note 5 at 714-715 (pointing out that 
"well advised foreign investors will hold U.S. real estate in foreign corporate solution, and will 
dispose of it by selling tbe stock"; "[t]he remaining impact of FIRPT A, then, will fall on tbe poorly-
advised, tbe blunderers, and the few who---for other reasons--cannot use foreign corporate owner-
ship. It is difficult to justify tbe continued existence of the complex FIRPT A tax and withholding 
regime for such limited and often-whimsical purposes"). 
1935ee supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text. 
1945ee Blum, supra note 5 at 673. 
195However, even witb a further reduction in the price paid for the stock, tbe amount received for 
tbe stock may be attractive when compared to the after-tax proceeds of an asset sale. See supra notes 
126-130 and accompanying text. 
196Even with the existence of such a global market, where a foreign person holds a USRPHC 
tbrough a home country/treaty corporation, only foreign persons from that same country would 
likely be eligible holders of tbe stock in the treaty corporation. This is because tbe treaty benefits 
would probably not be available if foreign persons from other countries owned the stock in the 
foreign corporation; and absent the treaty benefits, a foreign person would probably prefer to use a 
tax haven corporation to hold the USRPHC. Nevertheless, tbere may be an extensive market for U.S. 
real estate even witbin that single treaty country, especially given the fact tbat many of the United 
States' treaty partners are developed, populous nations. Alternatively, a foreign person from a non-
treaty country could acquire stock in the treaty corporation by using a tax haven corporation to 
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operations that offer U.S. real estate to clients in many foreign countries. 197 And, 
the recent corporate inversion phenomenon indicates that buyers are not reluc-
tant to purchase stock in tax haven corporations,198 although there may be some 
difference in this regard between the publicly-traded corporations used in inver-
sions and the c~osely-held ones used to hold USRPHCs. 
d. Gauging the Increase in Stock Sales that Would Result from the Repeal of 
the USRPHC Rules. Despite these mitigating factors, the previous analysis sug-
gests that repealing the USRPHC rules will lead to an increase in the number of 
situations where foreign persons dispose of U.S. real estate via stock sales. By 
opening up this form of acquisition to U.S. buyers, and with any hidden liabili-
ties belonging to a U.S. corporation (as opposed to a tax haven company), it 
should be easier to locate a buyer who is willing to acquire U.S. real estate by 
way of a stock purchase. In evaluating the equity and efficiency costs of repeal-
ing the USRPHC rules, it is important to have a clear sense of the effect on the 
manner in which foreign persons dispose of U.S. real estate. 
To gain a better understanding of these effects, this Article recommends that 
the federal government undertake a study that seeks to gauge the increase in the 
number of U.S. real estate dispositions via stock sales that would result from 
repealing the USRPHC rules. 199 In conducting this study, the government should 
obtain data on sales by foreign persons of U.S. real property (both asset and 
stock sales), as well as information from lawyers and real estate professionals on 
their experience in structuring real estate transactions under the current rules and 
how this would be affected by repealing the USRPHC rules. Such a study may 
reveal, for example, that even with repeal and the resulting larger potential 
market for stock sales, the concerns over unknown corporate liabilities and a 
looming tax liability are so great that buyers would rarely acquire U.S. real 
estate by way of a stock acquisition.zoo Or it may be that foreign markets for U.S. 
purchase the stock. The tax haven corporation could then liquidate the treaty corporation and receive 
the stock in the USRPHC. While the liquidating distribution of the USRPHC stock should be free of 
U.S. tax under Regulation section 1.897-5T(c)(2)(ii), there may, however, be tax consequences in 
the treaty country. In any event, it appears that foreign persons typically use tax haven corporations, 
rather thari treaty corporations, to hold USRPHCs given the general desire for home country ano-
nymity and other factors. See supra note 147-149 and accompanying text. 
197 Among the firms providing global real estate services are CB Commercial, Jones Lang LaSalle, 
LaSalle Investment Management, and ONCOR International. Further evidence of a global market for 
U.S. real estate is the existence of organizations such as the Association of Foreign Investors in Real 
Estate ("AFIRE"), which is devoted to the needs of foreign investors in advocating and promoting 
international real estate investments. 
198C! Treasury Office of Tax Policy, Corporate Inversion Transactions 4 (May 2002) (pointing out 
that after the inversion transaction, the former shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation typically 
hold stock in a foreign corporation that is incorporated in a country that imposes little or no income 
tax (e.g., Bermuda)). 
l""This would be reminiscent of the study that gave rise to FIRPTA. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF 
TREASURY, supra note 82. 
""'Indeed, there was testimony to this effect during the Senate hearings on the FIRPT A. See 
Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Marshall J. Langer) (claiming that with the elimination of a 
step-up in basis upon a corporate liquidation to a purchaser of U.S. realty, virtually nobody would be 
willing to buy stock in a U.S. real estate holding corporation). 
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real estate are so extensive (and the concern over hidden liabilities with respect 
to tax haven corporations not so great) that opening up the stock acquisition 
technique to U.S. buyers would have little effect.201 In either case, these findings 
would suggest that repealing the USRPHC rules would have minimal equity and 
efficiency costs. On the other hand, a study may indicate that with the primary 
market for U.S. real estate being U.S. buyers, opening up the stock acquisition 
technique to these buyers will substantially increase the likelihood of disposing 
of U.S. realty through a stock sale notwithstanding the corporate liability con-
cerns, thus indicating that the equity and efficiency costs of repeal may indeed 
be significant. 202 
e. Offsetting Competitive Benefits of Repealing the USRPHC Rules. The 
efficiency costs of eliminating the USRPHC rules would be offset to a degree by 
the competitive benefits that would flow to U.S. purchasers as a result of repeal-
ing the rules. As discussed previously, the efficiency basis of FIRPTA supports 
having more similar tax treatment of foreign and U.S. investors in U.S. real 
estate in order to allow U.S. purchasers to compete more effectively with their 
foreign counterparts.203 The repeal of the USRPHC rules may further this effi-
ciency goal incrementally by allowing U.S. buyers to compete on an equal 
footing with foreign buyers (to a degree) where a foreign person desires to 
dispose of U.S. real estate via a stock sale. 
Under the current rules, a foreign buyer would have a competitive advantage 
over a U.S. buyer in purchasing U.S. real estate from a foreign person, because 
the former may be willing to engage in a stock acquisition whereas the latter 
probably would not.204 For example, assume that a nonresident alien owns all of 
the stock of a foreign corporation, which in tum owns all of the stock of a U.S. 
corporation whose only asset is improved U.S. real property with a fair market 
value of $3,000,000 and adjusted basis of $2,000,000. Assume that the present 
value of the tax benefits attributable to a step up in the adjusted basis of the 
realty is $100,000. Assume also that the U.S. corporation is subject to U.S. tax at 
a flat rate of 35%. Another nonresident alien offers to purchase the stock in the 
foreign corporation for $2,800,000, which represents the value of the real estate, 
$3,000,000, less a $100,000 discount for forgoing a stepped-up basis in the 
realty, less another $100,000 reduction due to the risk of unknown corporate 
liabilities. Because the sale of the foreign stock is not taxable by the United 
States, the nonresident alien seller would receive the full $2,800,000. In order 
20lIn this regard, it is not inconceivable that despite the primary market for U.S. real estate being 
U.S. buyers, foreign sellers can be drawn to foreign markets in order to take advantage of the 
FIRPT A exception for dispositions of foreign stock. 
202Nevertheless, even with such findings repealing the USRPHC rules may not necessarily result 
in a lighter U.S. tax burden for foreign persons versus their U.S. counterparts with respect to U.S. 
real estate. See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text. Moreover, there would still remain the 
question as to whether the equity and efficiency benefits of the rules warrant the administrative costs 
involved. Part IlI.B.2 examines the administrative costs of the USRPHC rules. 
203See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
204See supra notes 178-191 and accompanying text. 
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for a U.S. purchaser to provide an equivalent after-tax amount to the seller in an 
asset acquisition of the real estate, the U.S. purchaser would have to pay 
$3,230,769 for the real estate,20S which is considerably more than the property's 
fair market value. Thus, under the current rules it is possible for a foreign buyer 
to outbid a prospective U.S. buyer by offering less for the real property, thereby 
experiencing a competitive advantage.206 
Repealing the USRPHC rules and opening up the stock acquisition technique 
to U.S. buyers would remove this particular competitive advantage. This is not 
to suggest, however, that the competitive benefits of repealing the USRPHC 
rules necessarily offset any competitive costs of doing so. By eliminating the 
USRPHC rules and allowing for more situations where foreign persons can 
dispose of their U.S. realty activities by way of stock sales, it may be that the 
prospects for lower tax costs on dispositions will induce foreign persons to 
outbid their U.S. counterparts for purchases of U.S. realty, and that the amount 
of additional U.S. real estate purchased by foreign persons will exceed the 
amount of additional U.S. real estate acquired by U.S. persons on sales by 
foreign persons. Nevertheless, at a minimum, one should recognize the 
countervailing competitive effect of eliminating the USRPHC rules, especially 
given what might be a fairly weak efficiency (and equity) case for retaining the 
rules. 
f. Equity Costs With Respect to Certain Beneficiaries of USRPHC Repeal. As 
the previous subsections suggest, the equity and efficiency costs of repealing the 
USRPHC rules may be insignificant because of the limited number of disposi-
tions of U.S. real estate via U.S. stock sales, the possible ability to engage in 
foreign stock dispositions in any event, and the offsetting competitive benefits 
flowing to U.S. buyers. Nevertheless, certain foreign persons who would be 
taxed under the USRPHC rules would clearly benefit from their repea1.207 These 
would include foreign investors who may not have an avenue for disposing of 
205$3,230,769 - .35($3,230,769 - $2,000,000) = $2,800,000. 
206Cf Matthews, supra note 140 at 1166, 1167-68 (commentators claiming that Regulation section 
1.897-5T(c), which serves as a backstop to the USRPHC rules by taxing a liquidation of a foreign 
real estate holding corporation by its U.S. parent following an acquisition of the foreign corporation 
by the parent, places widely-held U.S. corporations seeking to acquire U.S. real estate owned by 
foreign persons at a competitive disadvantage verses their foreign counterparts, given that a V.S. 
purchaser would need to liquidate the foreign corporation in order to get the real estate into the U.S. 
corporate group); Benjamin G. Wells and James A. Baker, IV, Baker and Botts Say FIRPTA Regula-
tions Should Allow Deferral of Tax on Inbound Reorganizations When u.s. Property Remains in 
Domestic Hands, 88 TAX NOTES TODAY (TA) 140-39 (similarly pointing out that Treasury Regulation 
section 1.897-5T(c) places acquiring U.S. corporations at a competitive disadvantage versus their 
foreign counterparts). Carolyn Joy Lee, NYSBA Urges Tax Writers to Scrap Proposed Foreign 
Shareholder Tax, 95 TAX NOTES INT'L (TA) 225-13 (Nov. 22, 1995) (in commenting on 1989 
proposal to impose U.S. tax on net gains derived by ten percent foreign shareholders on dispositions 
of stock in V.S. corporations, NYSBA points out that on sales to foreign purchasers, foreign share-
holders are likely to have more flexibility in structuring the transactions to avoid the tax than with 
respect to sales to V.S. purchasers; concluding that the heaviest burden of the tax would likely fall 
on sales to U.S. purchasers). 
2°'As mentioned previously, most well-advised foreign investors will avoid the tax under the 
VSRPHC rules. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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their interests other than by way of a disposition of stock in a USRPHC: for 
example, a foreign person who disposes of her minority interest in a USRPHC 
via a sale to another person or a stock redemption. Also included are foreign 
persons who, as a result of poor or no tax advice, sell stock in a USRPHC, as 
opposed to having the USRPHC sell the underlying U.S. real estate or selling 
shares in a foreign holding company. 
With the USRPHC rules, these taxpayers are effectively subject to two levels 
of tax with regard to their interests in U.S. real estate-a tax on the gain recog-
nized on the disposition of the USRPHC stock, plus a likely reduction in the 
purchase price of the shares to reflect a portion of the future tax liability at the 
corporate level. In contrast, with a repeal of the USRPHC rules only an effec-
tive, discounted tax would apply in these situations. 
While there is some uncertainty, it appears that repealing the USRPHC rules 
brings about the more equitable result with respect to these taxpayers. Although 
equity vis-a-vis U.S. persons may be served by imposing two levels of tax on a 
foreign person's gains that are attributable to holdings in U.S. corporations, the 
current policy (which this Article assumes to be correct)208 is that foreign per-
sons are generally not subject to two levels of U.S. tax on their gains attributable 
to property held in U.S. corporate solution.209 Moreover, equity is not advanced 
by exacting a second level of tax only with respect to those foreign persons who 
are unable to take advantage of exceptions thereto, either because of their par-
ticular circumstances or a lack of tax expertise. And while subjecting these 
foreign persons to a discounted tax on their U.S. realty gains violates equity vis-
a-vis U.S. persons, it advances equity with respect to foreign persons who have 
the ability and wherewithal to dispose of U.S. real estate via sales of foreign 
stock. Consequently, it appears that repealing the USRPHC rules would not 
produce equity costs with regard to the class of foreign persons who would 
otherwise be taxed under the rules. 
2. Administrability 
The USRPHC rules appear to produce significant administrative costs for 
both taxpayers and the government. Some of these costs are due to the USRPHC 
rules themselves, while other administrative costs result from several ancillary 
provisions. This section examines these two categories of complexity caused by 
the USRPHC rules. 
a. Direct Costs of USRPHC Rules. Although the section 897 tax on stock 
sales applies infrequently,2IO the USRPHC rules appear to create considerable 
administrative burdens for both taxpayers and the IRS because of its potential 
208See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
209ln particular, the USRPHC rules were not designed as a second level of tax on U.S real estate 
held in U.S. corporate solution. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
210See supra note 140 and accompanying text; Blum, supra note 5 at 674 (noting that the tax under 
the USRPHC rules rarely applies). 
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applicability.211 Under the USRPHC rules, buyers of stock in privately-held U.S. 
corporations are generally required to withhold tax under section 1445 unless 
the seller is not a foreign person or the corporation has not been a USRPHC 
within the previous five years.212 Consequently, the buyer ordinarily needs to 
obtain from the seller a certificate of non-foreign status in order to determine 
that she is not subject to a withholding obligation.213 A foreign seller can avoid 
withholding by obtaining, before the sale, a determination from the corporation 
that it has not been a USRPHC within the testing period.214Alternatively, the 
foreign seller can request the corporation or the IRS to make such a determina-
tion after the sale and file a refund claim for overwithheld taxes.215 
The determination of USRPHC status by either the U.S. corporation or the 
IRS involves significant rule ,complexity and potential factual uncertainty. Test-
ing for USRPHC status requires a determination as to whether the fair market 
value of the corporation's USRPIs equals or exceeds 50% of the sum of the fair 
market value of the corporation's USRPIs, foreign real property, and other assets 
used or held for use in a trade or business.216 Consequently, the application of 
the test may well involve factual uncertainty regarding the fair market value of 
property,217 as well as whether property is considered as used or held for use in a 
business.218 A corporation may rely upon an alternative book value test that 
creates a presumption of non-USRPHC status if the accounting book value of 
the corporation's USRPIs is 25% or less of the aggregate book value of its 
relevant assets.219 However, a corporation exceeding this lower threshold must 
establish fair market values for purposes of the general test, and the Service can 
rebut the presumption of non-USRPHC status based on information as to the fair 
market values of the corporation's assets.220 The regulations require that the 
corporation be tested for USPRHC status on "determination dates."221 The deter-
2lJSee, e.g., Blum, supra note 5 at 674; Letter from New York Bar Ass'n Tax Section to House 
Ways and Means Comm., supra note 5. 
212See I.R.C. § I 445(a), (b)(2), (b)(3); Reg. § 1.1 445-2(b), (c). 
2l3See Reg. § 1.1 445-2(b)(2). 
214See Reg. §§ 1.1445-2(c)(3), 1.897-2(g), -2(h). 
215See Reg. § 1.897-2(g). Issues regarding USRPHC status can also arise during Service audits. 
See I.R.M. 4233, § 4.61.12.5 (Service instructions to its examiners on determining USRPHC status 
during audits); see also Charles D. Rubin, New Audit Guidelines in the IRS Manual Target FIRPTA 
Transactions, 80 J. TAX'N 170 (1994) (describing an earlier version of the audit guidelines for 
FIRPTA transactions). 
216I.R.C. § 897(c)(2). 
217See Reg. § 1.897-1(0) (traditional valuation methods used); Kaplan, supra note 42 at 1106 
(noting that appraisals of real estate often vary considerably and thus determining whether a corpora-
tion is a USRPHC with any confidence may be difficult). 
218See Reg. § 1.897-1(f) (suggesting a fact-specific inquiry); RUFUS RHOADES & MARSHALL J. LANGER, 
U.S. 1NrERNATIONAL TAXATION AND TAX TREATIES, 'lI 31.03 (noting the uncertainty of whether cash and 
treasury bills constitute assets used or held for use in a trade or business). 
219See ~eg. § 1.897-2(b)(2). See Hirschfeld and Grossman, supra note 150 at 41 (noting that the 
book value of assets is fairly easy to determine). 
220See Reg. § 1.897-2(b)(2)(iii). 
221See Reg. § 1.897-2(c). The statute, taken literally, suggests that a continuous monitoring of the 
USRPHC fraction is required. The regulations mitigate this apparent statutory requirement by creat-
ing the determination date mechanism. See Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-32. 
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mination date mechanism is a source of considerable complexity because testing 
is required on the last day of the corporation's taxable year, as well as on the 
date of any transaction that could potentially cause the corporation to become a 
USRPHC,222 with the latter category subject to a very intricate set of excep-
tions.223 For situations where the U.S. corporation owns controlling interests in 
other corporations, or interests in noncorporate entities, the statute and regula-
tions treat the corporation as owning a proportionate share of the assets of the 
other entity for purposes of applying the USRPHC test224-another set of provi-
sions that appears to be a source of intricacy and factual uncertainty. 
Even though it is quite atypical for a foreign person to dispose of U.S. real 
estate by way of a sale of U.S. corporate stock, frequent determinations of 
USRPHC status may still be necessary. This is because such determinations 
must be made throughout a corporation's existence, and the threshold for being 
a USRPHC is no greater than 50% of the corporation's assets consisting of 
USRPls.225 Thus, a privately-held U.S. corporation owning a business which 
includes U.S. real property (e.g., manufacturing) would need to determine its 
status as a USRPHC at least annually if it has any foreign shareholders,226 
because of the possibility that one of the foreign shareholders will dispose of her 
stock.227 Consequently, even with their limited applicability, eliminating the 
USRPHC rules would produce simplification benefits by sparing foreign taxpay-
ers (and their advisers) the burden of understanding and complying with the 
rules.228 
The USRPHC rules also provide several planning opportunities and traps for 
the unwary. As discussed previously,229 a foreign person could avoid the USRPHC 
222See Reg. § 1.897-2(c)(l); Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-32. 
223See Reg. § 1.897-2(c)(2). In lieu of using the general approach for determination dates, the 
corporation may elect an alternative approach that requires determination dates at the end of each 
month as well as on the dates of certain acquisitions or dispositions of relevant assets. See Reg. 
§ 1.897-2(c)(3). 
224See 1.R.c. § 897(c)(4)(B), (c)(5); Reg. § 1.897-I(e), -2(e). 
225Indeed, the threshold is lower where some of the corporation's assets are other than real 
property or trade or business assets. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 
alternative book value presumption standard uses a 25% threshold. See supra note 219 and accompa-
nying text. 
226C! Renfroe, Fogarasi, Gordon, and Venuti, supra note 108 at 1416 (in describing the taxpayers 
that would be affected by the proposed U.S tax on dispositions of U.S. stock by ten percent foreign 
shareholders, noting that foreign investors in privately-held U.S. corporations include foreign raid-
ers, mutual funds, leveraged buyout funds, partnerships, as well as foreign parent corporations). 
mC! Austrian and Schneider, supra note 149 at 401 (pointing out that a U.S. corporation owning 
a U.S. manufacturing plant will be a USRPHC where the value of its real property is relatively 
significant). 
mC! STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note I at 437,442 (noting similar simplifica-
tion benefits ofrepealing sections 86I(a)(2)(B) and 871(a)(2». As previously discussed, this Article 
recommends that the federal government undertake a study that seeks to gauge the increase in the 
number of U.S. real estate dispositions via stock sales that would result from repealing the USRPHC 
rules. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. In connection with this study, it is recommended 
that the government further analyze the administrative burdens that result from the USRPHC rules 
by obtaining input from tax advisers and Service personnel. 
229See generally Part m.B.I.c. 
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rules by disposing of stock in a foreign corporation that holds the USRPHC.230 
Another technique would be to keep the U.S. corporation's percentage ofUSRPIs 
below the 50% threshold during the testing period.23I Where a disposition of 
stock in a USRPHC does occur, the holder can avoid the tax on the stock 
disposition by selling the USRPIs and distributing the proceeds in liquidation.232 
A sale of USRPHC stock to the buyer presents a particularly egregious trap for 
the poorly advised, in that the seller would suffer an avoidable tax in addition to 
bearing, most likely, a portion of the tax liability at the corporate level. 
b. Costs of Ancillary Rules. There are several regulatory provisions ancillary 
to the USRPHC rules that serve as backstops to circumventing the rules. For 
example, the Treasury has issued regulations that provide for tax on a liquidat-
ing foreign corporation with respect to prior dispositions of the corporation's 
stock, where it distributes USRPIs to its U.S. parent corporation in what other-
wise would be a tax-free liquidation under sections 332 and 337.233 The USRPIs 
held by the foreign corporation typically would be in the form of stock in a 
USRPHC because of branch profits tax concems.234 In light of GU Repeal, the 
distributed USRPIs would continue to be subject to U.S. taxation in the hands of 
the U.S. corporate distributee.235 Consequently, Treasury's purpose for modify-
ing nonrecognition treatment is apparently to tax the disposition of foreign stock 
in situations where a U.S. transferee ultimately receives stock in a USRPHC.236 
Stated differently, without this provision a foreign person could effectively transfer 
USRPHC stock to a U.S. corporate buyer and avoid the USRPHC rules by first 
230See Dale, supra note 5 at 714-715 (pointing out that because of the ability to avoid the USRPHC 
rules by selling stock in a foreign corporation, the remaining impact of the rules after the au Repeal 
will fall on the poorly advised, among others). 
21 ' Alternatively, in some circumstances a foreign shareholder may be able to wait until the end of 
the five year period of taint (contained in section 897(c)( I )(A)(ii)) before disposing of stock in a 
U.S. corporation. 
232See supra note 96 and accOl)1panying text. In this regard, it should be noted that the regulations 
aim to prevent a "loss stuffing" technique under which a foreign person contributes depreciated 
property to a U.S. corporation with the intention of recognizing losses at the corporate level in order 
to offset any gain recognized by the corporation on the disposition of USRPIs. See Reg. § 1.897-
6T(c)(2) (not allowing the use of losses upon sales or exchanges in certain circumstances). Because 
of this technique's potential for avoiding a corporate level U.S. tax on gain attributable to apprecia-
tion in USRPls, it might be wise to retain this anti-avoidance measure even if the USRPHC rules are 
eliminated. 
mSee Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(2), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403. 
234See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text. 
2l5See I.R.C. § 336(a). 
236C! Matthews, supra note 140 at 1166 (the drafters' intent was to put the selling shareholders of 
an inbound foreign corporation in the same U.S. tax position as they would have been if the 
corporation had always been a U.S. corporation); NYSBA Tax Section Comments on FIRPTA Non-
recognition Regulations, 89 TAX NOTES TODAY (TA) 30-57 (Feb. 7, 1989) (speculating that the 
reason for the rule is to impose a surrogate U.S. tax on foreign persons' prior sales of foreign stock 
in order to require a toll charge for the domestication of a foreign corporation holding USRPls like 
that which occurs when a section 897(i) is made); Robert F. Hudson, Florida Bar Tax Section 
Opposes Complexity and Double Taxation Under Section 897 Regulations, 88 TAX NOTES TODAY 
(TA) 155-34 (1988) (referring to the regulations' objective of imposing a surrogate tax on sales of 
foreign stock by foreign persons where a foreign corporation is domesticated) [hereinafter "Hudson, 
Florida Bar Comments"]. 
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selling stock in a foreign corporation that holds a USRPHC and then having the 
buyer liquidate the foreign corporation.237 Thus, the provision appears to be 
primarily a backstop to circumventing the USRPHC rules. In addition, the regu-
lations provide backstops to the USRPHC rules by similarly taxing other tech-
niques of eliminating a foreign corporation following a disposition of its stock, 
by using a reorganization or section 355 distribution.238 These backstops to the 
USRPHC rules not only result in significant rule complexity,239 but also can 
require the cumbersome task of determining the amount of tax plus interest on 
the gain from all prior dispositions of stock in the foreign corporation.240 Of 
course, if the USRPHC rules were eliminated, then these backstop provisions 
should be eliminated as welL241 
Other regulatory provisions serve an ancillary function by promoting the policy 
underlying the USRPHC rules after GU Repeal. For example, the regulations 
provide that upon an exchange of a USRPI for stock in a U.S. corporation, 
nonrecognition treatment under section 351 will apply only if the U.S. corpora-
tion is a USRPHC immediately after the exchange.242 In a post-GU repeal world, 
the transferred USRPI will continue to be subject to U.S. taxation, regardless of 
whether the corporate transferee is a USRPHC.243 However, in the absence of 
this rule, a foreign person could transfer a USRPI to a U.S. corporation that is 
not a USRPHC immediately after the exchange, obtain nonrecognition treatment 
on the exchange,244 and then sell the U.S. stock in a transaction free of U.S. 
mAs discussed previously, a U.S. person typically would not want to hold a USRPHC through a 
foreign corporation. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text. 
238See Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(4), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403 (C, D, and F 
reorganizations); Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(3) (section 355 distributions). 
239See BmKER AND EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 'lI 
15.85[I][b) n.949 (Supp. 2002) (describing Regulation sections 1.897-5T and 1.897-6T as truly 
awful provisions that are extraordinarily complex); Hudson, Florida Bar Comments, supra note 236 
(noting that these rules add a tremendous amount of complexities). 
2
40See Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403 (in the case of section 332 liquidations as well as C, D, 
and F reorganizations that are subject to these provisions, requiring that the foreign corporation pay 
an amount equal to all taxes, plus interest, that would have been imposed on all dispositions of stock 
in the foreign corporation after June 18, 1980 as if the corporation were a U.S. corporation on the 
date of the dispositions). 
241An additional reason for eliminating the backstop provisions with the repeal of the USRPHC 
rules is that these provisions as written would be substantially ineffective without the USRPHC 
concept. That is, under current law the distributions of USRPIs that typically fall within the scope of 
these provisions are distributions of stock in USRPHCs. Therefore, without the USRPHC rules, the 
interests distributed would not be USRPIs, and thus the provisions would not apply, nor would there 
be taxable gain in any event. See Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 264 n.17 (noting that 
whether a foreign transferor of USRPHC stock recognized gain would matter little if the gain were 
not subject to tax). Of course, if it is decided on policy grounds to retain the backstop provisions 
even with the elimination of the USRPHC rules (which would be wrong), Congress could retain the 
USRPHC rules solely for these provisions. Consequently, a policy basis for eliminating these provi-
sions is warranted. 
24'See Reg. § 1.897-6T(a)(I). 
243See I.R.C. § 336(a). 
244See I.R.C. § 351. 
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tax.245 Consequently, an apparent purpose for this rule is to prevent the possibil-
ity of an ownership change in a USRPI without the imposition of an immediate 
U.S. tax-the policy underlying the USRPHC rules after GU RepeaJ.246 Simi-
larly, the regulations247 which restrict nonrecognition treatment on transfers of 
USRPIs to foreign corporations promote the immediate tax policy underlying 
the USRPHC rules by limiting the ability to use the foreign stock sale exception 
to the USRPHC rules; the USRPIs would continue to be subject to U.S. taxation 
in the hands of the foreign corporation in light of GU Repeal (and mini repeal, 
per section 897(d)(1» and the fact that FIRPTA overrides any treaties to the 
contrary.248 These foreign-to-foreign exchange rules are a particularly intricate 
set of provisions, with nonrecognition treatment dependent on meeting detailed 
requirements regarding the structure and circumstances of the transaction.249 If 
the USRPHC rules were repealed, and the "immediate tax" policy was thus 
abandoned,250 these special nonrecognition rules can be eliminated as well.251 
245See I.R.C. § 897(a), (c)(I)(A)(ii). 
246See supra note 106 and accompanying text. This rule can also serve as a backstop to the 
USRPHC rules by preventing the tax-free transfer of USRPHC stock to another U.S. corporation that 
is not a USRPHC after the exchange, in anticipation of selling the new stock. It should be noted that 
while these policies underlie Regulation section 1.897-6T(a), the real impetus for the regulation may 
well have been the language of section 897(e)(I). This subsection generally provides that nonrecog-
nition provisions will apply for purposes of section 897 only where a USRPI is exchanged for 
property that would be subject to U.S. tax upon its sale. Nonetheless, based on the authority granted 
under section 897(e)(2), Treasury did carve out some exceptions in providing for nonrecognition 
treatment on certain transfers of USRPIs to foreign corporations. See Reg. § 1.897-6T(b), which is 
described in note 191. 
247Reg. § 1.897-6T(b). 
248See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
240See supra note 191 for a description of these rules; cf Robert F. Hudson, Jr., An Analysis of 
Temporary FlRPTA Regs. Under § 897(d) and (e) (Partll), 4 TAX MOMT. REAL EsTATE J. (BNA) 243 
(Oct. 5, 1988). Under section 897(d) and (e) (Part II) (pointing out that there is a theoretical matrix 
of 15 types of transactions that could qualify for nonrecognition under the rules and commenting that 
it is unfortunate that the regulations provide only two examples given the rather complicated matrix 
of requirements). Along with the administrative costs associated with this and the other special 
nonrecognition rules are costs in terms of being at odds with other policy objectives. The nonrecog-
nition rules may be justified by the policy of according current tax-free treatment to transactions that 
lack non-tax significance. See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization 
and Recognition Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. I (1992). Thus, to the extent that 
the FIRPT A rules modify or override nonrecognition treatment for transactions that otherwise re-
ceive such treatment, the policy objectives underlying nonrecognition are sacrificed in order to 
advance other objectives. This is not to suggest it is never worth surrendering the policy objectives 
underlying nonrecognition. It is simply to say that there is a policy cost to modifying and overriding 
nonrecognititon rules that should also be considered in a costlbenefits analysis of the USRPHC rules. 
250See supra note 241 for an additional reason for repealing the special corporate nonrecognition 
rules that use the USRPHC concept. 
'mCf Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 263-64 (pointing out that if the USRPHC rules were 
repealed, many of the concerns underlying the FIRPT A special nonrecognition rules would disap-
pear; concluding that with the GU Repeal, it is possible to substantially simplify FIRPT A by 
repealing the USRPHC rules and modifying the regular corporate nonrecognition rules only to the 
extent of ensuring that the transferee's basis in a USRPI does not exceed the transferor's basis plus 
the amount of gain recognized by the transferor under the particular nonrecognition rule). Even with 
the repeal of the USRPHC rules and abandonment of the immediate tax policy, the foreign-to-
foreign exchange rules may continue to serve a useful purpose by taxing transfers of USRPIs to tax 
haven corporations that are incorporated in countries lacking exchange of information agreements 
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A provlSlon that is derivative of the USRPHC rules and special corporate 
nonrecognition rules is section 897(i). This section permits a foreign corporation 
to elect to be treated as a U.S. corporation for purposes of FIRPT A where the 
corporation is entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment under a treaty, holds a 
USRPI, and would qualify as a USRPHC upon making the election.252 Congress's 
purpose for allowing this election was to blunt claims that FIRPT A discrimi-
nates against foreign corporations because of the different treatment accorded 
U.S. corporations under the statute.253 While GU Repeal has generally leveled 
the tax playing field for foreign and U.S. corporations with respect to distribu-
tions, some differences remain for distributions as well as exchanges as a result 
of the special corporate nonrecognition provisions.254 Consequently, if the 
with the United States (see supra note 191 for the requirements set forth in Regulation section 1.897-
6T(b)(2». The apparent concern with such transfers is that it would be more difficult for the United 
States to enforce the tax on a disposition of the USRPI by the transferee foreign corporation. 
Nevertheless, a foreign person could defeat this purpose by initially holding the USRPI in a tax 
haven corporation. Therefore, for foreign persons acquiring USRPIs after the publication of Treasury 
Regulation section 1.897-6T (which occurred on May 5, 1988), the rules may present merely a trap 
for the unwary. 
Another rule that appears to fall within this category is the special treatment of REITs under the 
USRPHC rules. While domestically-controlled REITs are excepted from the USRPHC rules, other 
REITs (that is, "foreign-controlled" REITs) are not. See LR.C. § 897(h)(2). Arguably, if the USRPHC 
rules were eliminated, the foreign-controlled REIT rule should go as well, along with the rule's 
additional administrative costs (that is, the effort that goes into determining what constitutes a 
domestically-controlled REIT, as provided in section 897(h)(4)(B». Cf Staffaroni, Foreign Inves-
tors in RICs and REITs, 56 TAX LAW. 511, 563 (2003) (pointing out the difficulty of determining 
whether a widely-held REIT is domestically controlled, as well as the lack of direct authority on the 
meaning of indirect foreign ownership in the context of the domestically-controlled determination). 
While this is probably sensible, it should be pointed out that there might be stronger equity and 
efficiency bases for retaining the immediate tax policy in the REIT situation because shares in 
REITS are disposed of more frequently than typical USRPHC interests. The equity and efficiency 
bases for retaining these rules are weakened somewhat by the treatment accorded domestically-
controlled REITS, but this treatment may be due to the fact that in the domestically-controlled 
context, tax planning for foreign persons is not likely to dominate the REIT's disposition and 
distribution policies. See supra note 119. On the other hand, as with non-REIT USRPHCs, a foreign 
person can hold REIT shares through a foreign corporation and may be able to dispose of the shares 
by selling stock in the foreign corporation, thus avoiding an immediate U.S. tax on the disposition. 
Cj supra Staffaroni, at 551 (noting that where REIT shares are held through Australian listed 
property trusts that are treated as foreign corporations under the check-the-box rules, sales of the 
trust units are not taxable to the unit holders under FlRPTA). Moreover, with the exceptions in the 
USRPHC rules for publicly-traded corporations along with domestically-controlled REITs, many 
foreign investors are not taxable under FIRPT A on their dispositions of shares in REITS (see supra 
Staffaroni, at 568), thus further suggesting that the equity and efficiency costs of repealing the 
foreign-controlled REIT rule may be minimal. And of course, the administrative downside with 
retaining the foreign controlled REIT rule is that the USRPHC machinery would have to be kept 
alive for this purpose. 
252See LR.C. § 897(i); Reg. § 1.897-3(b), -8T(b). 
253See Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-55. 
254For example, while a liquidating distribution of a USRPI by an 80% owned U.S. corporation to 
its U.S. parent would be tax free under section 337, the same transaction by a foreign corporation 
could be taxable under Regulation section 1.897-5T(c), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 
403. As another example, a foreign person would receive nonrecognition treatment under section 
351 and Regulation section 1.897-6T(a) on a transfer of a USRPI to a U.S. corporation in exchange 
for stock, provided the corporation is a USRPHC immediately after the exchange; however, a 
transfer of a USRPI to a foreign corporation generally would be taxable under Regulation section 
1.897-6T(a), (b). 
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USRPHC and special corporate nonrecognition rules were to be eliminated, the 
purpose for allowing the section 897(i) election should vanish and thus so should 
the election.255 The administrative costs of the Hi" election include significant 
rule complexity256 as well as several tax planning opportunities.257 
3. International Tax Concerns 
As with the direct USRPI rule, a revised analysis of the benefits and costs of 
the USRPHC rules should consider international tax concerns, that is, the United 
States' obligations under income tax treaties and the limitations that arise out of 
the desire to harmonize the income tax laws of different countries. While Con-
gress presumably has determined already that the equity and efficiency benefits 
Because of these differences under current law, the "i" election can be advantageous in certain 
circumstances; however, the benefits of the election have waned over the years. Prior to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, the election allowed foreign investors to obtain preferential capital gains 
taxation (at the individualleveI) on the disposition of U.S. realty held through a foreign corporation, 
by taking advantage of old section 337 to insulate the gain from taxation at the corporate level. See 
Hudson, supra note 145 at 3043. GU Repeal, however, removes this major benefit of the election. 
See id. Moreover, while the election can reduce gain recognition under the regulations in reorganiza-
tions involving foreign corporations holding USRPIs, Notice 1989-85 (which modifies Regulation 
section 1.897-5T(c» achieves the same result in most situations. See id. On the other hand, the 
election is still beneficial where a foreign person transfers a USRPI to a foreign corporation, because 
without the election the transfer likely would be taxable under Regulation section 1.897-6T. See 
Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-59. The election may also be useful to avoid the ten percent 
withholding tax under section 1445 where a foreign corporation disposes of a USRPI (see Hudson, 
supra note 145 at 3043; Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-60); nevertheless, the reduction in 
U.S. tax is not likely to be significant because there would still be liability for the substantive 
FIRPTA tax. See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3043. 
255'fwo other commentators also recognize that it would be possible to eliminate the "i" election 
with the repeal of the USRPHC rules, but concluded otherwise because of the limitations imposed 
under Treasury Regulation section 1.897-6T(a) on the ability of a foreign corporation to use sections 
1031 and sections 1033. See Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 264 n.18. This regulation 
provides that the nonrecognition provisions apply on a foreign person's transfer of a USRPI only to 
the extent that the transferor receives a USRPI in the exchange. After 1989, section 1031 is no 
longer applicable to an exchange of a USRPI for foreign real property by either a U.S. or foreign 
exchanger. See LR.C. § 1031 (h)(I). Therefore, Regulation section 1.897-6T(a)'s limitations are no 
longer relevant to the application of section 1031. However, it is possible to receive nonrecognition' 
treatment under section 1033 on an involuntary conversion where the relinquished property is a 
USRPI and the replacement property is foreign real estate. See' LR.C. § 1033(a)(2), (g); H. CONF. 
REp. No. 101-386, at 614 (1989) (non-like-kind treatment of U.S. and foreign real property does not 
apply for purposes of section 1033(g». Consequently, Regulation section 1.897-6T(a) continues (and 
should continue, even with the repeal of the USRPHC rules) to limit a foreign corporation's ability 
to use section 1033, and thus to this extent there would continue to be differences in the tax 
treatment of foreign and U.S. corporations under FIRPT A, even with the elimination of the USRPHC 
and special corporate nonrecognition rules. Nevertheless, it does not appear to be worth the adminis-
trative effort to retain the "i" election solely for the involuntary conversion situation. 
256See Reg. § 1.897-3, as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403. 
257For example, Regulation section 1.897-6T(a)(7), examples 7 through 10, provide four identical 
factual situations with different tax results depending on whether the foreign corporations involved 
have made "i" elections. It should be noted that to some extent these different tax results under the 
regulations are eliminated with the modifications made by Notice 1989-85 with respect to reorgani-
zations and "i" elections. 
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of FIRPT A outweigh the negative consequences of overriding existing treaty 
obligations258 and deviating from international tax norms, the reduced benefits of 
the USRPHC rules suggest that a reconsideration of this issue is in order. 
As mentioned previously, the United States entered into 12 of its 55 current 
income tax treaties prior to the adoption of FIRPT A. 259 Seven of these treaties 
contain provisions that conflict with, and are overridden by,260 the USRPHC 
rules.261 Consequently, to a limited extent the USRPHC rules may continue to 
produce treaty override costs in terms of diplomatic capital and potential reper-
cussions.262 On the other hand, since the adoption of FIRPTA, the United States 
has entered into 43 treaties that permit the application of the USRPHC rules.263 
2S8 See supra note 82. 
259See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
260As noted earlier, FIRPT A prevails over conflicting treaty obligations as of January I, 1985. See 
supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
261See Income Tax Convention, July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg., art. 13, 23 U.S.T. 2687; Income Tax 
Convention, Feb. 12, 1979, U.S.-Hung., art. 12,30 U.S.T. 6357; Income Tax Convention, May 7, 
1975, U.S.-Ice., art. 16,26 U.S.T. 2004; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan, art. 16, 
23 U.S.T. 967; Income Tax Convention, June 4,1976, U.S.-Korea, art. 16,30 U.S.T. 5253; Income 
Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1974, U.S.-Pol., art. 14,28 U.S.T. 891; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 4, 
1973, U.S.-Rom., art. 13,27 U.S.T. 165. 
262e! Kaplan, supra note 42 at 1113 (noting these as the costs of treaty override in the context of 
FIRPTA); see Lee, supra note 206 (pointing out the damage to international relations and the risk of 
a retaliatory response as the costs of treaty override in the context of a proposed tax on the gain 
realized on stock dispositions by foreign persons owning at least ten percent of the stock in a U.S. 
corporation). 
263See Income Tax Convention, May 14, 1953, U.S.-Austl., art. 13,4 U.S.T. 2264; Income Tax 
Convention, May 31, 1996, U.S.-Aus., art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 10570; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 
31, 1984, U.S.-Barb., art. 13,22 U.S.T. 164; Income Tax Convention, July II, 1986, U.S.-Berm., 
TAX TREATIES (CCH) '![ 1403.02 (no article dealing with capital gains); Income Tax Convention, Sept. 
26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11087; Income Tax Convention, Apr. 30, 1984, U.S.-
P.R.C., art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 12065; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 19, 1984, U.S.-Cyprus, art. 16,35 
U.S.T. 4737; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 16, 1993, U.S.-Czech Rep., art. 13, TAX TREATIES 
(CCH) '![ 2403.03; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 19, 1999, U.S.-Den., art. 13, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 
'![ 2500.02; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 25, 1998, U.S.-Est., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 
24,1980, U.S.-Egypt, art. 7, 33 U.S.T. 1809; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 21,1989, U.S.-Fin., art. 
13, T.I.A.S. No. 12101; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 31, 1994, U.S.-Fr., art. 13, TAX TREATIES 
(CCH) '![ 3001.04; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-F.R.O., art. 13; Income Tax Con-
vention, Sept. 12, 1989, U.S.-India, art. 13, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'lI 4203.05; Income Tax Conven-
tion, July II, 1988, U.S.-Indon., art. 14, T.I.A.S. No. 11593; Income Tax Convention, July 28, 1997, 
U.S.-Ir., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Nov. 20, 1975, U.S.-Isr., art. 7; Protocol with Respect to 
Income Tax Convention, Apr. 17, 1984, U.S.-Italy, art. I, '![ I I, T.I.A.S. No. 11064; Income Tax 
Convention, May 21, 1980, U.S.-Jam., art. 13,33 U.S.T. 2865; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 24, 
1993, U.S.-Kaz., art. 13, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'lI 5303.02; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 15, 1998, 
U.S.-Lat., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 15, 1998, U.S.-Lith., art. 13; Income Tax Conven-
tion, Apr. 3, 1996, U.S.-Lux., art. 14, TAX TREATIES (CCH) '![ 5701.05; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 
18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 12404; Income Tax Convention, Aug. I, 1977, U.S.-
Morocco, art. 13,33 U.S.T. 2545; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 13, 1993, U.S.-Neth., art. 14, TAX 
TREATIES (CCH) '![ 6103.04; Income Tax Convention, July 23, 1982, U.S.-N.Z., art. 13, 35 U.S.T. 
1949; Income Tax Convention, Oct. I, 1976, U.S.-Phil., (Senate reservation to art. 14),34 U.S.T. 
1277; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 6, 1994, U.S.-Port., art. 14, TAX TREATIES (CCH) '![ 7803.04; 
Protocol with Respect to Income Tax Convention, June 17, 1992, U.S.-Russ. Fed'n, 'lI 6, TAX 
TREATIES (CCH) '![ 6103.04; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1993, U.S.-Slovk. Rep., art. 13, TAX 
TREATIES (CCH) 'lI 8103.06; Income Tax Convention, June 21, 1999, U.S.-Slovn., art. 13; Income 
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Repealing the USRPHC rules may therefore provide these foreign signatories 
with a benefit for which they had not bargained. The fact that the USRPHC rules 
apply infrequently264 minimizes any concern with regard to overriding conflict-
ing treaty obligations. However, it may be determined that repealing the USRPHC 
rules would result in a considerable increase in the number of U.S. real estate 
dispositions via stock sales,265 and thus, a significant lowering of the tax burden 
for foreign investors in U.S: realty; if that is the case, the unexpected benefit 
provided to 43 foreign signatories may be an additional factor in favor of retain-
ing the USRPHC rules.266 
Unlike the direct USRPI rule,267 the USRPHC rules appear to be at odds with 
the tax laws of at least several other countries.268 Consequently, this raises the 
possibility that the rules may lead to international double taxation, because other 
countries may not be providing either credit or exemption relief where the United 
States taxes their residents on dispositions of USRPHC stock. However, with 
their limited application, the USRPHC rules should not pose a significant risk of 
double taxation. 
4. Evaluation' 
The revised policy analysis suggests that serious consideration should be given 
to the elimination of the USRPHC rules. With GU Repeal, the rules have the 
potential for producing equity and efficiency benefits by generally imposing an 
immediate U.S. tax upon an ownership change in U.S. real property held in U.S. 
corporate solution. Nevertheless, these equity and efficiency benefits may be 
Tax Convention, Feb. 17,1997, U.S.-S. Afr., art. 13; Protocol with Respect to Income Tax Conven-
tion, Feb. 22, 1990, U.S.-Spain, 'll1O(a), 1591 U.N.T.S. 41; Income Tax Convention, Sept. I, 1994, 
U.S.-Swed., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., art. 13; Income Tax Con-
vention, Nov. 26, 1996, U.S.-Thail., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, June 17, 1985, U.S.-Tunis., 
art.13; Income Tax Convention, March 28, 1996, U.S.-Turk., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 
4, 1994, U.S.-Ukr., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, July 24, 2001, U.S.-U.K., art. 13; Income Tax 
Convention, Jan. 25,1999, U.S.-Venez., art. 13, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'llII,103.06. In addition, the 
treaty with Norway has been amended to permit taxation under the USRPHC rules. Protocol with 
Respect to Income Tax Treaty, Sept. 19, 1980, U.S.-Nor., art. 6, 23 U.S.T. 2832. 
'
64See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text; Blum, supra note 5 at 674 (noting that the tax 
on USRPHC stock rarely applies). 
'6'Part III.B.l.d recommends that the federal government conduct a study to gauge the increase in 
U.S. real estate dispositions via stock sales that would result from repealing the USRPHC rules. 
266S uch a finding would also indicate that retaining the USRPHC rules increases the tax liability of 
foreign persons that hold U.S. real estate; this in turn suggests that even though the USRPHC rules 
apply infrequently, the indirect tax liability resulting from the rules may continue to raise concerns 
of treaty override with respect to some U.S. treaty partners. To a limited degree, this may offset any 
concerns about providing foreign signatories with an unexpected benefit by repealing the USRPHC 
rules. 
2·'See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
268In this regard, the American Law Institute reported in 1992 that many countries do not impose 
tax on gains realized by nonresidents from dispositions of capi tal assets, except for assets connected 
with a business conducted in the particular country or real estate located therein. On the other hand, 
the ALI also noted that some countries treat real property holding companies as transparent, thus 
taxing gain on the disposition of their shares. See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax 
Project, International Aspects of United States Income Taxation II: Proposals of the American Law 
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insignificant in light of the following factors: the limited extent to which foreign 
persons would avail themselves of sales of stock in U.S. real estate holding 
corporations if the USRPHC rules were repealed, the possible ability of foreign 
persons to avoid the USRPHC rules by selling stock in foreign corporations 
holding USRPIs, and the offsetting competitive benefits to U.S. persons that 
may result from repealing the rules. In this regard, this Article recommends that 
the federal government undertake a study that seeks to gauge the increase in the 
number of U.S. real estate dispositions via stock sales that would result from 
repealing the USRPHC rules. Furthermore, with the avoidable nature of the 
section 897 tax on stock sales and the potential double tax that occurs where the 
tax applies, it does not appear that equity is advanced even with respect to those 
foreign persons that are taxed on the disposition of stock in a USRPHC. Signifi-
cantly, the USRPHC rules appear to create considerable administrative burdens 
for taxpayers and the government due to the complexity of the rules themselves 
as well as that of ancillary provisions. On the other hand, international tax 
concerns may not be an important factor in the analysis because of the limited 
tax liability effects of the rules. On balance, the equity and efficiency benefits of 
the USRPHC rules may not warrant the significant administrative costs involved.269 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The interrelated and fluid nature of U.S. tax law requires policymakers and 
scholars to monitor the law for provisions that no longer serve legitimate poli-
cies, but merely clutter and complicate a system bordering on unworkable. Re-
cent efforts in this regard by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation have 
been fruitful (yet unrealized for the most part), and this Article applies this type 
of analysis to provisions under FIRPT A. 
An examination of the direct USRPI rule indicates that while the provision is 
somewhat superfluous as a result of subsequent changes in the tax law, it contin-
ues to advance the equity and efficiency underpinnings of FIRPT A by ensuring 
that foreign persons are subject to U.S. tax on dispositions of investment inter-
ests in U.S. real property. Moreover, the direct USRPI rule serves to simplify the 
tax law by substantially obviating the need to determine whether a foreign 
person's U.S. real estate acti~ities constitute a U.S. trade or business for pur-
Institute on United States Income Tax Treaties 201-203 (1992). Finland imposes such a tax, and 
Canada generally taxes gains on the disposition of stock in privately-held Canadian corporations 
whether or not the corporations hold Canadian real estate. See Robert Couzin and Mark Novak, 
Business Operations in Canada, 955-3d TAX MGMT. PORTFOUO (BNA) A-30 to A-31 (2003); Risto 
Rytohonka, Business Operations in Finland, 960-2d TAX MGMT. PORTFOUO (BNA) A-58 (2003). 
269Cj Blum, supra note 5 at 675 (concluding that the USRPHC rules should be repealed because 
the direct administrative burdens of administering the rules seem disproportionate to the amount of 
loophole closing achieved); Fred Feingold and Peter A. Glicklich, An Analysis of the Temporary 
Regulations Under FlRPTA: Pan II, 69 J. TAX'N 348, 354 (1988) (concluding that instead of 
drafting the special FIRPT A nonrecognition rules, it would have been more useful to devote this 
energy to conforming FlRPTA to the realities of the world post-GU Repeal; if that had been done, 
FlRPT A could have been dramatically simplified by eliminating the USRPHC rules). 
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poses of applying the effectively connected income tax regime. Consequently, 
the direct USRPI rule should .be retained. In addition, the law should be further 
simplified and improved by eliminating the net basis election for U.S. real 
property and instead treating all income from US. real property, whether from 
operations or dispositions, as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business. 
On the other hand, sound policy objectives may no longer support the USRPHC 
rules. With GU Repeal, the role of the USRPHC rules has been reduced to 
ensuring that a foreign person's disposition of stock in a USRPHC is subject to 
an immediate U.S. tax, rather than what is effectively a' discounted tax, thus 
possibly advancing equity and efficiency to this extent. Whether Congress in-
tended for this secondary·role when it enacted FIRPTA is unclear. In any event, 
the equity and efficiency benefits of the USRPHC rules may be insignificant, 
especially given the general reluctance of buyers to engage in stock acquisitions 
of U.S. realty and the possible ability of foreign persons to avoid the current 
USRPHC rules by disposing of stock in a foreign corporation. Because these 
benefits may be outweighed by the significant administrative costs of the USRPHC 
rules, this Article recommends that serious consideration be given to the elimi-
nation of the USRPHC rules.270 
27DIn order to evaluate the equity and efficiency costs of repealing the USRPHC rules, this Article 
recommends that the federal government undertake a study that seeks to gauge the increase in the 
number dispositions of U.S. real estate via stock s~les that would result from repealing the rules. 
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